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INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, discovery was the most innovative and
controversial feature of the litigation process conceived by the
then-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' It remains the
most debated, and in some cases the most fractious and vexing,
aspect of litigation today.2 Members of the practicing bar, judi-
t Visiting Professor, The University of Michigan Law School. I wish to
thank Anita Bernstein, Edward H. Cooper, Samuel R. Gross, William D.
Johnston, Margaret C. Kline Kirkpatrick, William M. Richman and Mark D.
West for enlightening commens, and Rochelle Tedesco and Randi Ren6 Vickers
of the class of 2000, The University of Michigan Law School, for valuable re-
search assistance.
1. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2001 n.21 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1999).
2. See Rya W. Zobel, Foreword to THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND
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ciary, legal academy and media espouse widely differing views
about the real or supposed existence, extent and nature of dis-
covery problems.3 In part, this divergence of opinion is attrib-
utable to the paucity, until recently, of sufficient data from
which to generalize with confidence about the working of dis-
covery in practice.4
Two empirical studies of discovery conducted under the
auspices of the Federal Judicial Center 5 and the RAND Insti-
tute for Civil Justice,6 respectively, however, have yielded com-
plementary data that support certain basic generalizations.
First, discovery problems and associated elevated levels of sat-
ellite litigation and expense are most likely to be concentrated
in a minority of lawsuits characterized by high stakes, high
levels of complexity, high levels of contentiousness or high vol-
umes of discovery activity,7 cases which today constitute ap-
proximately one-third of the caseload of federal courts. 8 Second
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN
CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES at i, v (1997) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER REPORT]; Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Allocation: Comment on
Cooter and Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 465 (1994).
3. These range from the view, on one extreme, that discovery abuse is
rampant, see, e.g., RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPO-
RATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 102 (1996), to
that on the other, that widespread discovery abuse is fantasy rather than re-
ality. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth
of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemak-
ing, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994).
4. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research
on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785 (1998); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Dis-
closure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Noth-
ing?", 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 706-14 (1995). Both contain useful surveys of re-
sults of earlier studies.
5. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2.
6. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DIS-
COVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
7. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 2, 21; RAND
REPORT, supra note 6, at xxvii. This finding mirrors that of a 1978 Federal
Judicial Center Study that the incidence and volume of discovery tended to be
high in securities, trade regulation, tort, intellectual property, admiralty and
contract cases, and that discovery volume was likely to be high in product li-
ability, patent and franchise contract cases. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL.,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE
PROCESS: DISCOVERY 43-44 (1978), cited in McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 4,
at 791.
8. See Kathleen L. Blaner et al., Federal Discovery: Crown Jewel or
Curse?, 24 LITIG. 8, 10 (1998). The gradual raising of the jurisdictional mini-
mum amount in controversy requirement in diversity cases in federal courts
506 [Vol. 84:505
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and more surprising, discovery is not significantly problematic
but is working "effectively and efficiently" in the majority of
civil cases.9
The RAND Report also asserts that "[e]mpirical research
has not produced evidence of widespread abuse of discovery." 0
No doubt this state of affairs is partly due to the lack of consen-
sus among practicing lawyers and commentators as to what
constitutes discovery "abuse." Definitions variously proposed
include overreaching discovery beyond what the rules require
or what is necessary to prove the proponent's case; discovery of
information not needed by the proponent but having potential
for coercing the respondent to settle because of its confidential
or embarrassing nature; discovery taken primarily to impose
expense and delay on the respondent rather than to obtain in-
formation for the lawsuit; discovery for purposes unrelated to
the litigation in which it is sought (such as obtaining access to
protected and otherwise unavailable intellectual property);
propounding discovery requests to which the costs of respond-
ing exceed the anticipated increase in value of the proponent's
claim or defense; withholding discoverable information or ma-
terials on the basis of groundless boilerplate objections; and
unjustifiable or bad faith assertions of privilege. About the
only thing these definitions of discovery abuse have in common
is that they are practices lawyers attribute to their adversaries
but rarely admit to themselves."I
from $3,000 to $10,000 in 1958, to $50,000 in 1988, to $75,000 in 1996, closing
the door on diversity cases for small amounts, has tended to ensure that diver-
sity cases brought today mostly involve significant financial stakes. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 commentary on the 1996 amendment (West Supp. 1999).
9. See RAND REPORT, supra note 6, at xxii; Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We
Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of Amendment?, 39
B.C. L. REV. 517, 523 (1998). These results largely confirm the perceptions
and conclusions reached by Wayne D. Brazil in his 1980 American Bar Foun-
dation study. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Ef-
fectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
789, 869-74 [hereinafter Brazil, Civil Discovery]; Wayne D. Brazil, Views from
the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil
Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 222-35.
10. RAND REPORT, supra note 6, at xv.
11. See John D. Shugrue, Identifying and Combating Discovery Abuse, 23
LITIG. 10, 12 (1997) ("Finding a litigator who will readily confess to having
abused discovery is equivalent to the proverbial an[d] futile search for the
needle in the haystack."). But see MARK PERLMUT'TER, WHY LAWYERS (AND
THE REST OF Us) LIE AND ENGAGE IN OTHER REPUGNANT BEHAVIOR 11, 28, 38
(1998) (describing experiences of unethical conduct).
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Lest too rosy a picture emerge from the RAND and Federal
Judicial Center Reports, however, it is empirically demonstra-
ble that discovery disputes occur in substantially greater num-
bers than in years past, and that today federal judges address
discovery disputes in many more reported opinions than before.
Table 1 shows the chronological dispersion by five-year periods
of 3,128 opinions in which the term "discovery dispute" appears
in Westlaw's Allfeds database. Even assuming that these
numbers are over-inclusive,' 2 it is indisputable that federal dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals addressed or alluded to dis-
covery disputes during the decade just concluded in almost
three times as many reported opinions as in the previous dec-
ade, and during the five years from 1994-98 in twenty-one
times as many reported opinions as in the five years from 1974-
78.
TABLE 1
, , U..% j: ,~ s : ': ,,'U.S. U 'uS '" .uS , /  S' s
SUPREME COuRTS DiSmTT _BANK- COURT TAX.
S6 COURT OF COURTS RUPTOY ".,O F. CO RTob
.... APPEAS COURTS CLAIMS ____
1994- 135 1043 59 12 2
1998-
1989- 91 884 43 7 2
1993
1984- 1 45 540 17 2
1988
1979- 1 16 160 2 3
1983
1974- 7 48 1
1978 7 48 1
1969- 1 6
1973 1 6
Reported opinions from United States Courts in which term "discovery dis-
pute" appears. Source: Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database (Feb. 1999).
12. I have not attempted to exclude criminal prosecutions in which opin-
ions referred to discovery disputes or to correct these numbers for other possi-
ble type I error, that is, false positives. Thus, if a judge wrote, "Pretrial litiga-
tion was remarkably free of any discovery disputes," such a case would still
appear in the numbers in Table 1. My assumption, however, is that judges
would rarely include the words "discovery dispute" in a reported opinion un-
less pretrial litigation actually contained a discovery dispute that the judge
thought noteworthy.
[Vol. 84:505
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These numbers may reflect increased filings, greater judi-
cial attention paid to pretrial litigation, 13 the trend toward
"managerial" judging,14 a tendency by parties to seek judicial
resolution of discovery disputes, and the increasing ease with
which judicial opinions are published electronically. Nonethe-
less, particularly since reported opinions addressing discovery
disputes are undoubtedly just the tip of the iceberg of judicial
treatment, the numbers can also be taken to confirm the com-
mon impressions of judges and lawyers that discovery disputes
and "hardball" litigation tactics are far more common today
than they used to be.' 5 Also, regardless how we define "discov-
ery abuse," the increased and apparently still increasing fre-
quency of discovery disputes strongly suggests that over-
discovery, evasion, delay, and confrontation rather than coop-
eration remain problematic aspects of civil discovery practice. 16
Opinions on the causes of persistent discovery problems
vary widely. Commentators blame everything from the liberal
scope of civil discovery, 17 to supposed asymmetries between
costs of responding to discovery and anticipated increases in
value of proponents' claims or defenses,' 8 to excesses of adver-
sarial behavior and a perceived decline in professionalism and
civility among litigators, 19 to asserted judicial failures to exer-
13. See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1984).
14. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
15. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 121
F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc) ("With alarming frequency, we find
that valuable judicial and attorney time is consumed in resolving unnecessary
contention and sharp practices between lawyers. Judges and magistrates of
this court are required to devote substantial attention to refereeing abusive
litigation tactics that range from benign incivility to outright obstruction.");
ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 182 (1990) (stating that respect for authority in
the courtroom and elsewhere is less pronounced and pervasive in the 1990s
than in the 1930s).
16. See Shugrue, supra note 11, at 10-11.
17. See, e.g., ACF Indus. Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087 n.6 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting letter from Hon. Grif-
fin B. Bell that in his experience as a judge, practicing lawyer and Attorney
General of the United States, "the scope of discovery is far too broad").
18. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of
Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 452-54 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter &
Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery]; Robert D. Cooter & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO. L.J. 61, 63 (1995)
[hereinafter Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules].
19. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1994); E. Norman Veasey, Making it Right: Veasey Plans Action
20001
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cise control over pretrial proceedings or to impose meaningful
sanctions on lawyers who take undue advantage of the proc-
ess.
20
Since each of these views has explanatory value, it is not
surprising that disagreement abounds as to what should be
done to alleviate current problems with discovery and to pre-
vent future ones. Unfortunately, however, the solutions most
often proposed are unlikely to succeed. They include: first, nar-
rowing the scope of civil discovery ordinarily available under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; second, calling for more
firm and constant judicial intervention from an early point in a
lawsuit; and third, promoting greater education in and adher-
ence to norms of professionalism and civility.
First, the pending amendment of Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that would alter the referent in the
relevance standard governing civil discovery from "the subject
matter involved in the pending action" to "the claim or defense
of any party,"21 although an apparent limitation, is basically a
semantic change unlikely to have much salutary effect on the
to Reform Lawyer Conduct, BUS. L. TODAY, MarJApr. 1998, at 42, 42-43.
20. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 154-55 (1968); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representa-
tion in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 726-31 (1997);
Helen H. Stern Cutner, Discovery-Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer
Looks at the Federal Discovery Rules After Forty Years of Use, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
933, 955-56 (1979); Barbara J. Gorham, Note, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of
Discovery Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 765, 782-83 (1994).
21. See infra pp. 537-43. In August 1998, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States published for public comment a Preliminary Draft of Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (1998) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
The key changes proposed for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as ap-
proved by the Judicial Conference of the United States include: scaling back
the automatic disclosure provision of Rule 26(a) and eliminating the current
authorization for districts to opt out; modifying the scope of discovery by
striking "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" from
the definition of scope in Rule 26(b)(1) and substituting "relevant to the claim
or defense of any party"; limiting the length of depositions in Rule 30(d)(2) to
seven hours unless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the par-
ties and the deponent; and adding a provision to Rule 34(b) that makes ex-
plicit courts' power to limit excessive discovery by allowing courts to condition
discovery on payment of part or all of the responding party's expenses by the
requesting party. See id. at 34-35, 41-42, 60, 65-66; see also Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 81-82 (last modified Aug. 9,
1999) <http'//www.uscourts.gov/rules/propcivil.pdf>.
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conduct of discovery in the hurly-burly world of litigation. It is,
however, certain to generate more discovery disputes and
greater need for judicial attention, since the proposed amend-
ment still permits subject-matter-relevant discovery on court
order and discovery proponents are unlikely to curtail the scope
of requests voluntarily.22
Second, more judicial attention to discovery disputes and
earlier, firmer and more constant judicial management of dis-
covery-heavy cases would involve opportunity costs to docket
management too great for many judges to accept.23 Proponents
of discovery reform have been calling continuously for earlier
and more resolute judicial management of discovery for almost
as long as liberal discovery has been in effect. Since the early
years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a common theme
of conferences of lawyers and judges was how to tame the large,
complex, "protracted" case through vigorous judicial supervi-
sion of discovery.24 If judges have not universally heeded these
calls in the past, they are hardly likely to do so now.
Furthermore, incentives to adversarial excess in discovery
are simply too great in complex and high-stakes cases to yield,
in the absence of effective sanctions,25 to high-minded exhorta-
tions about civil behavior among professionals. 26 Although
courts certainly have the power to sanction discovery violators,
many are reluctant to impose severe sanctions in the discovery
context because of the oft-enunciated policy that cases should
be decided on their merits. Also, though they rarely say so,
many judges are reluctant to impose sanctions that may ad-
versely affect the professional reputations and livelihoods of
lawyers who practice before them.27
22. See infra pp. 540-41.
23. See infra pp. 564-69 & note 250.
24. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Procedure in Anti-Trust
and Other Protracted Cases, reprinted in "Short Cuts" in Long Cases: A Com-
mentary on the Report Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted
Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 83 (1951); James Alger Fee et al., Proceedings of the
Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319 passim
(1958); Irving R. Kaufman, Judicial Control over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111,
111-16 (1960); Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Super-
vision over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1961); Irving R. Kaufman, Report on
Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55, 61-63 (1957).
25. See infra pp. 571-78.
26. For discussion of the inadequate incentives to cooperate in discovery
in high-stakes cases, see infra pp. 550-52.
27, See infra Part VIII.
2000]
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This state of affairs should not surprise students of proce-
dure. Despite repeated changes to the discovery rules in 1946,
1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1980, 1983, 1991 and
1993,28 discovery is once again on the rulemakers' agenda, thus
apparently still in need of fixing.29 It is a serious mistake,
however, to think that discovery can be perfected by additional
incremental changes to the Rules, 30 or that problems can be
eliminated. The reason is simple: discovery is riven to the core
with irreconcilable theoretical and practical conflicts and will
remain so despite recurring reform efforts. Given the nature of
discovery's defects, what it would take to cure them, and the
limits imposed on possible change by fundamental values of our
litigation system, discovery disputes are likely to plague us for
a very long time, perhaps forever.
This Article considers several fundamental faults inherent
in the civil discovery process. It examines the aggravating per-
28. Without any pretense to exhaustiveness, these amendments provided
the following major changes, in addition to many others less significant or of a
technical nature. In 1948, the requirement of leave of court for taking deposi-
tions was eliminated, see Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure,
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 453 (1946); it was recognized that
there should be no arbitrary limits on the number or scope of interrogatories,
see id. at 461; the standard for document production and inspection was eased
from documents "material to the case" to documents "related to the case." Id.
at 463. In 1970, insurance policies were explicitly made discoverable, see Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov-
ery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487 (1970); automatic grant of priority was eliminated, see
id. at 488; the party seeking discovery was made responsible for invoking judi-
cial determination of discovery disputes, id. at 522; and the motion to compel
was widened to apply to all discovery devices except for mental and physical
exams under Rule 35, see id. at 538. In 1980, discovery conferences with the
court were first authorized, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 526 (1980), and depositions were permitted to be recorded
by non-stenographic means, see id. at 528. In 1983, the sentence of Rule 26(a),
which provided that the frequency of use of discovery mechanisms was not to
be limited, was deleted, a sentence was added to Rule 26(b) permitting courts
to limit discovery; and Rule 26(g), which encouraged judges to impose appro-
priate sanctions for discovery abuse, was added. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advi-
sory committee notes to the 1983 amendments. In 1993, new automatic dis-
closure provisions were provided for the first time. See Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 628 (1993).
29. See supra note 21. But see Niemeyer, supra note 9, at 523.
30. In a well-known dissent from the Supreme Court's adoption of the
1980 amendments to Rules 26, 33, 34 and 37, Justice Powell wrote that while
the amendments themselves were "not inherently objectionable[,] ... Con-
gress' acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption
of genuinely effective reforms." Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 446 U.S. 997, 997-1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 84:505
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sistence, especially but not exclusively in complex and high-
stakes litigation, of overdiscovery, evasion and delay, as well as
confrontation rather than cooperation, and associated expendi-
tures of both party and judicial time and resources.31 It then
considers what can and what cannot be done to improve the
process, consistent with the Rules' beneficent purpose of facili-
tating "the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."32
The Article concludes that civil discovery suffers from con-
ceptual inconsistencies and structural flaws so basic that it is
doubtful whether it can ever work as intended in most complex
and high-stakes cases. It certainly could not do so without far-
reaching changes not only in the Rules, but also in the pre-
vailing economics and culture of adversarial litigation and in
judicial practices and behavior. Changes dramatic enough to
be effective would fundamentally and, in all probability, unac-
ceptably change the nature of American adversarial litigation.
Although it may seem peculiar to state what many practicing
lawyers know from experience and intuition, concentrating on
trying to eradicate discovery problems has diverted attention
from the facts reflected in the Federal Judicial Center and
RAND studies. The great wonder is not that discovery does not
work perfectly, but that in spite of its defects, it succeeds as
well as it does in the majority of cases.
I. DISCOVERYS ELUSIVE IDEAL
At the dawning of the age of litigation enlightenment in
the federal courts in 1938, with the advent of the newly crafted
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery in civil litigation
was intended to be an essentially cooperative, self-regulating
process for which the parties would take responsibility, with
little judicial intervention required.33 Significant benefits were
anticipated (and substantially have been achieved) from the
provision of procedures for avoiding dispositions on the basis of
technicalities of pleading, eliminating from trials the element of
31. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 722 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("ET]he time and expense associated with... discovery... have increased.").
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
33. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for
More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30 ViL. L. REV. 767, 775 &
n.34 (1985).
20001
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unfair surprise, 34 assuring instead that cases would be decided
on their merits or compromised according to their strengths
and weaknesses, 35 and eliminating systematic unfairness re-
sulting from disparities of wealth and power by prescribing
means by which less powerful litigants could obtain the infor-
mation necessary to prove their claims.36
The rulemakers and the Supreme Court thus provided a
set of new tools to aid in factual investigation and defining is-
sues: depositions upon oral examination,37 depositions upon
written examination,38 interrogatories to parties, 39 requests for
production of documents and things and entry upon land for in-
spection and other purposes,40 physical and mental examina-
tions of persons 41 and requests for admission.42 Except for
document discovery, which until 1946 was subject to a narrow
standard requiring documents to "constitute or contain evi-
dence material to any matter" involved in the action and until
1970 could be obtained only on a showing of good cause, 43 the
new rules permitted inquiry into a wide range of matters by
employing the new discovery devices.44 In 1993, three years af-
34. See GLASER, supra note 20, at 9. As Judge Keeton noted in his primer
on trial tactics, the impossibility of eliminating the chance of surprise com-
pletely while our litigation system remains adversarial not only renders the
system prone to abuse but also is a reason for its effectiveness. See ROBERT E.
KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 5 (1973).
35. See Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 F.R.D. 438, 442 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ("[C]ivil
trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way
is now clear.., for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before trial."); GLASER, supra note 20, at 114, 234; GEORGE
RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 251-66 (1932); Wayne D. Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298-1303 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery] (summarizing the purposes of the litigation con-
cept expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
36. See Blaner et al., supra note 8, at 8 (asserting that the drafters sought
to redress imbalance of power between wealthy and poor by mandating full
exchange of information).
37. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30.
38. See FED. R. Civ. P. 31.
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36.
43. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV.
747, 748 (1998).
44. Rule 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
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ter enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 45 which
was intended to reduce what Congress viewed as unacceptable
levels of expense and delay in litigation,46 the rulemakers and
the Supreme Court added required pretrial disclosures47 to this
toolbox (at least if the individual district court did not choose to
opt out of the automatic disclosure provision as the rule cur-
rently permits).48
The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ex-
pected the parties themselves to bear responsibility for pretrial
discovery and fact investigation, and in large measure, as the
Federal Judicial Center and RAND studies show, in routine
cases they do so without major problems.49 To make the proce-
dures work, cooperation and self-interested reciprocity between
the parties and between their lawyers were expected ordinarily
to suffice.50 Only when negotiation failed and the contestants'
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable
matter. The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The proposed amendments that have been approved
by the Judicial Conference of the United States would narrow this standard by
substituting the phrase "to the claim or defense of any party" for "the subject
matter involved in the pending action," permitting discovery into the subject
matter by court order on good cause shown. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note
21, at 41-42.
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
46. See Lawson v. Callahan, 111 F.3d 403, 404(5th Cir. 1997).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
48. The proposed amendments would eliminate the possibility of opting
out of the automatic disclosure provision by local rule, thus restoring national
uniformity as to automatic disclosure among federal district courts. See
PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 21, at 34-36.
49. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 2, 21; RAND
REPORT, supra note 6, at xxvii-xxviii, 27.
50. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 357 n.24 (1978)
(noting that discovery "rules contemplate that discovery will proceed without
judicial intervention unless a party moves for a protective order.., or an or-
der compelling discovery"); Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Dis-
covery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992); Wayne D. Brazil,
Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions:
Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
873, 881-82 [hereinafter Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial
Development of Civil Actions]; Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing
Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REV. 579, 581.
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attorneys reached an impasse about requested information to
be exchanged was resort to judicial intervention anticipated.5'
The framers' instincts in this regard largely coincide with
the conclusions produced by game theorists' predictive model-
ing of discovery. Viewing discovery as a multi-move, iterated
"prisoner's dilemma," game theorists conclude that an approach
to discovery favoring reciprocity (as John Setear has called it, a
meta-strategy of "tit for tat")-which always cooperates the
first time it encounters a particular adversary and thereafter
cooperates in the current play if the adversary had cooperated
in their previous encounter, but defects in the current play if
the adversary had defected in the previous encounter-encour-
ages continuing cooperation and yields long-term premiums to
both participants.5 2
There are two caveats, however. First, although the "tit for
tat" meta-strategy is likely to be productive over an aggregation
of successive contests, there is no guarantee that it would be
the best choice in any single contest. Second, the meta-strategy
of "tit for tat" or reciprocity is more likely to be successful when
the players encounter each other repeatedly, but less likely to
be successful when they do not.5 3
Although self-interested reciprocity was the ideal, to expect
it to work in all cases54 was unrealistically optimistic because of
51. This essential conception of discovery received additional support in
the 1970 revision, which increased the availability of compensatory sanctions
for the party prevailing when judicial intervention was invoked. See 8A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 2288, at 664-66.
52. See, e.g., John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics
of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569,
593-601 (1989).
53. See id. at 598-99. This prediction appears to accord with experience.
In legal communities in which counsel encounter each other (and judges) re-
peatedly, anecdotal evidence suggests that "hardball" and discovery disputes
are less common. In large cities where mega-law firms are common and coun-
sel rarely encounter each other (or judges) repeatedly, confrontational behav-
ior and discovery disputes are more common. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, su-
pra note 19, at 537-41, 546-50. As Professor Cooper has suggested to me, this
may help to explain the finding of the Federal Judicial Center Report that
firm size is a factor correlating with increased discovery expense. FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Perhaps increased discovery
expense is attributable less to firm size than to the location of large firms in
litigation arenas that produce few repeat encounters. It is also true, however,
that more complex and high-stakes cases, which the Federal Judicial Center
found produce higher levels of contention and disputes in discovery, tend to be
handled by large firms.
54. As Chief Judge Joe E. Estes of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas wrote in 1959, "[t]he scope and spirit of the federal
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several basic conceptual and practical flaws in the discovery
process, as well as changes in the conduct of business and the
nature of law practice that the framers of the discovery rules
could neither have anticipated nor predicted. The first defect
in the process is that the cooperative ethos of discovery clashes
directly and irreconcilably with the oppositional character and
partisan norms of all other phases and attributes of adversarial
litigation. If the parties had been capable of cooperation,
chances are they would not have come (or continued) to litigate
in the first place.5 5 Furthermore, well-articulated and widely
accepted norms of adversariness and aggressiveness that many
lawyers take to define what it means to be a lawyer-especially
a "litigator"--and also what it means to represent a client loy-
ally and effectively conflict with and often overwhelm the less
well-defined and more amorphous duties imposed on advocates
by professional responsibility prescriptions and the discovery
rules to cooperate and not to overreach, overdiscover, delay,
evade or obstruct. It was thus naive to expect "that adversarial
tigers would behave like accommodating pussycats throughout
the discovery period, saving their combative energies for
trial,"56 as Professor Miller has aptly observed.
Second, the underlying philosophy of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which prefers that controversies be decided on
their merits than on the basis of technicalities, makes discovery
perform functions, especially in complex cases, that sometimes
strain the system and produce disputes. In particular, the in-
formation-gathering and issue-defining functions that discovery
must perform in a notice-pleading regime require broad and of-
ten copious discovery that generates disputes that require judi-
cial intervention to resolve. Depending on one's definition, this
voluminous discovery may also lend itself to "abuse."57
discovery rules are so broad and liberal that today complete discovery is virtu-
ally assured. All that need be done to obtain all relevant information in a case
is to avail oneself of the veritable arsenal of discovery weapons found in the
rules." Joe E. Estes, Discovery, 29 F.R.D. 280, 280 (1961).
55. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, supra
note 18, at 65; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 319, 320-21 (1991).
56. Miller, supra note 13, at 15.
57. See infra Part V for discussion of the view of some economists that
discovery misuse is discovery of which the expense of responding exceeds the
value of the information discovered.
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Third, although the Federal Rules seek "to minimize the
need for judicial intervention into discovery matters[,]"58 the
procedures they provide for adjudicating discovery disputes are
extremely cumbersome and incorporate an inefficient incentive
structure. Motions to compel discovery and motions for protec-
tive orders result in sanctions for losers too paltry to provide
sufficient inducements in complex or high-stakes cases to make
the discovery process cooperative or truly self-regulating.
Moreover, these procedures are both fact- and paper-intensive
and consume disproportionate amounts of judicial resources.5 9
Fourth, judges unrealistically tend to assume that discov-
ery's cooperative ideal should be realizable in all cases. It is
well known that judges dislike discovery disputes and that
some resent the time that resolving them takes from other ju-
dicial activities. Not infrequently, judges neglect lawsuits in
which the lawyers are engaged in discovery battles, allowing
them to languish unattended on their dockets while the law-
yers founder ever deeper into non-cooperation, confrontation
and impasse, a result also predictable by game theorists.
Fifth, and by no means least important, many courts tend
to treat discovery problems with inappropriate leniency even
when they involve egregious instances of obstruction, evasion
or suppression. The result is not only that clients and lawyers
inclined to pursue or retain informational advantage by vio-
lating discovery rules lack adequate incentives to compel their
compliance, but also that bad actors rarely are disciplined suf-
ficiently either to remove them from the arena or to deter
similar behavior by themselves or others in the future.
No less important in contributing to discovery problems
than these procedural flaws, however, have been several irre-
versible changes in the conduct of business and the practice of
law that would have been unforeseeable in 1938.60 First, the
appearance and ubiquity of high-speed photocopiers in the
58. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 (11th Cir.
1997).
59. See id. at 1367-68 ("[Slcarce judicial resources must be diverted from
other cases to resolve discovery disputes.").
60. Although the significance of these changes cannot be overemphasized,
they have often been overlooked or ignored by critiques of discovery in prac-
tice. See, e.g., BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND
DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 8 (1989) [hereinafter BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
REPORT] ("What has changed during the past fifty years is not the objectives of
the rules but the civil justice system itself-the number and kinds of cases, the
litigants, and the lawyers.").
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1960s and 1970s resulted in an exponential proliferation in the
number of documents and copies routinely distributed in the
conduct of business and fimdamentally changed the nature of
document discovery.
Infinitely more documents were available, and litigants
could routinely require adversaries to produce them. Docu-
ment searches, productions and reviews became endlessly more
expensive, and counsel in large or complex litigations could
both require their adversaries to search offices, warehouses and
archives for relevant evidence and inundate adversaries with
boxcars full of documents to occupy young associates' attention
for weeks, months and even years.6' In response to problems
including lack of space, expense of storage and difficulty of
searching mass quantities of accumulated documents, firms
and entities began to promulgate and implement "document re-
tention policies" (surely one of the greatest of euphemisms),
which provided for periodic culling of significant documents
from files and the routine destruction of all the rest. Not sur-
prisingly, document production is the discovery device most
frequently used and the discovery activity that generates the
highest percentage of problems, as the Federal Judicial Center
Report confirms.62
Second, and equally unforeseeable in 1938, the information
revolution of the 1980s and 1990s has had similarly expansive
effects on document discovery and is continuing to alter the
character of the discovery process. Specifically, the develop-
ment and universal adoption of powerful personal computers
and computer networks of both local and global scope and the
widespread use of electronic mail has resulted in the creation
and compact storage on electronic media of data and docu-
ments63 in a volume previously unimaginable.
Third, the size and complexity of lawsuits, hence the mag-
nitude of stakes they involve, exceed anything within the expe-
rience of the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Various factors have helped to increase the complexity and
61. Unusually candid, if cynical, observations about aspects of document
productions and review can be found in CAMERON STRACHER, DOUBLE
BILLING (1998).
62. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
63. The term "document" is usually defined broadly enough in requests for
production of documents pursuant to Rule 34, to encompass electronically re-
corded and stored messages and data, e.g., "'Document' means the original and
all non-identical copies of any written, graphic or recorded matter of any kind
or character, including all drafts."
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magnify the consequences of litigation. They include liberal
joinder of claims and parties to achieve efficiencies in adjudica-
tion, the advent of public-law litigation intended to restructure
institutions, acceptance of business combinations of national
and international scope, adaptation of the class action device to
comprehend statewide or national classes, and acceptance of
theories of collective liability in the mass tort context and
similar doctrinal innovations in other areas of law.
Fourth, the spectacular growth in the size of the legal pro-
fession during the past sixty years and the accompanying
emergence of global mega-firms probably could not have been
predicted by the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938. Among other effects, these developments have
resulted in firms too large to enforce professional ethics pre-
scriptions assiduously64 and the rarity in large cities of litiga-
tors encountering the same adversary repeatedly. One-time
encounters lessen the force of reputation as a restraining influ-
ence on adversarial behavior and do nothing to foster coopera-
tion.65
II. DISCOVERY AND THE NATURE OF ADVERSARIAL
LITIGATION
At the outset, the theory of discovery as an activity in
which information and evidentiary material is exchanged coop-
eratively among the parties with a minimum of judicial super-
vision conflicts irreconcilably with both the essence of all other
phases of adversarial litigation and the lawyer's ordinary role
in conducting it. The conflict between the parties and the eco-
nomic advantage the parties seek to attain through aggressive
discovery undermine the cooperative discovery dynamic envis-
aged by the rules, just as the oppositional character of other
facets of the litigation process overwhelm it. Had cooperation
been possible, the parties would not be in court. The nature of
litigation as a zero sum game magnifies the conflict, since one
side's winning a lawsuit is and can only be at the other's ex-
pense.
64. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics Crossfire: Two Legal Titans Face Off,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A22 ("[Liaw firms [should] be limited to 50 law-
yers, on the theory that some such scale is the maximum for maintaining an
effective ethical climate.").
65. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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In obvious contrast to the cooperative ethic that the Rules'
framers intended for discovery, other aspects of litigation retain
a fundamentally partisan and contentious character. As is well
known, adversarial litigation is first and foremost regulated
conflict, designed to be a stylized and non-violent substitute for
self-help. As one recent court opinion put it, "in civilized socie-
ties.., part of the reason we resolve disputes by making ap-
peals to reason and law in a courtroom is to avoid resorts to
threats of physical force."66
Apart from incidental, purely procedural endeavors in
which the lawyers are expected to work together, however, such
as scheduling or assembling a final pre-trial order,6 7 discovery
is the only part of litigation short of settlement negotiations in-
tended to be cooperative rather than oppositional. All other
parts of the process, from the pleadings to motion practice to
trial to appeal, are inherently partisan and contentious. In its
intended attitude of cooperation rather than disputation, then,
discovery is a striking anomaly and is often subject to inordi-
nate strain that it cannot bear.68
The ultimate source of the adversarial nature of Anglo-
American litigation is, in theory at least, the conflict between
the parties. The drama inherent in adversarial litigation de-
rives from its essence as regulated conflict.69 Clients who par-
ticipate in litigation commonly personalize the conflict, often
voicing expressions of antagonism, belligerence and vindictive-
ness.70 Where significant harms, rights and obligations are at
66. United States v. Cleveland, No. Crim. A. 96-207, 1997 WL 539664, at
*4 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1997).
67. Even these matters are extremely contentious on occasion. See United
States ex rel. Mobin v. Desert Constr., No. 95-1661, 1996 WL 328803, at *2-3
(9th Cir. June 11, 1996) (noting that counsel refused to cooperate in drafting
joint final pretrial order); Ward v. Mawee, No. 92-2579, 1994 WL 38682, at *1
(7th Cir. Feb. 9, 1994) (same); Four Star Capital Corp. v. Nynex Corp., No. 93
Civ. 3706, 1995 WL 594863, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995) (noting counsel un-
able to agree on schedule); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 822 F. Supp.
1099, 1106 (D.N.J. 1993) (same).
68. A study by Joseph L. Ebersole and Barlow Burke concluded inter alia
that "many of the causal factors [of discovery problems] arise out of the adver-
sary system itself." JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE & BARLOW BURKE, FEDERAL
JuDiciAL CTR., DIscOvERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES 72 (1980).
69. See ERIC BENTLEY, THE LIFE OF THE DRAMA 4 (1964) ("To see drama
in something is both to perceive elements of conflict and to respond emotionally
to these elements of conflict."). This fact goes far to explain the persistent
popularity of fictionalized and romanticized dramatizations of lawsuits and
prosecutions.
70. To the extent that clients take conflicts personally they make large
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stake, compromise has not been achieved, or prospective rami-
fications of a judgment are enormous, it is understandable that
both litigants and their lawyers exhibit strong feelings.71
Litigation aggressiveness7 2 consequently has enormous ap-
peal to clients.73 It is no accident that popular lawyer meta-
phors such as "hired gun," "gladiator," and "warrior" invoke the
imagery of killing, contest and battle. The stylized nature of
adversarial litigation as enshrined in American popular culture
requires that the conflict be conceived and often expressed in
images of armed hostility and warfare. These typically include
war's most destructive and wasteful exemplars: "war of attri-
tion," "scorched earth," "trench warfare," "taking no prisoners,"
and "giving no quarter." The ordinary ethos of litigation-that
of attack, battle and siege-is thus diametrically and, if the
stakes are high enough, fatally antagonistic to discovery's ideal
of cooperation.
Moreover, to the extent that success in litigation depends
on strategic informational advantage, discovery, contrary to its
inventors' expectations, is the critical battlefield on which the
war is waged.74 Generations of litigators, for example, have
emotional investments in litigation, and the potential for them to behave in
ways that are not obviously rational (at least by reference to conventional eco-
nomic measures) increases.
71. Given the uncertainty, expense and aggravation inherent in litigation,
the damages, rights and obligations at issue must by definition be "significant"
to the parties.
72. Recent empirical research suggests that litigators' aggressiveness may
be related to body chemistry. One study found that both male and female trial
lawyers had testosterone levels about 30% higher than non-trial lawyers, a
finding that seemingly corroborates common perceptions of trial lawyers as
having a "macho mystique and confrontational manner." James M. Dabbs, Jr.
et al., Trial Lawyers and Testosterone: Blue-Collar Talent in a White-Collae
World, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 84, 87 (1998). The study explicitly left
open the question whether increased testosterone levels cause or result from
the pugnacious environment in which litigators operate, although it expressed
doubt that trial work would have raised the subjects' testosterone levels, since
testosterone changes due to circumstance are usually temporary. See id. at
87-88; see also Juris Coj6nes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 1, 1998, at 27.
73. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 19, at 512 n.13 (citing quota-
tion of chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell that "Sullivan & Cromwell fights
tough.., and 'clients like a law firm that's aggressive'"). The appeal of ag-
gressiveness to clients conveniently coincides with the strategic advantages
thought by many lawyers to accrue from aggressive tactics and behavior.
74. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 3, at 63 ("Winning the discovery war
is often the key to winning the lawsuit...."); Marvin E. Aspen et al., Interim
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D.
371, 383 (1991) (stating that discovery too often is a "battlefield on which ver-
bal hostility, overly aggressive tactics and often automatic and unreasoned
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been schooled in discovery with advice such as "the key to suc-
cess in a deposition is gaining control of the room. '75 Given the
inconvenience and expense of responding to discovery or of
compelling a recalcitrant adversary to respond, discovery is
also one of the potent weapons with which the war is waged.76
That many lawyers and clients have trouble cooperating in a
process of which the unspoken underlying premise is "[glive me
all the information and evidence I demand, regardless how
much it may cost or disadvantage you, so I can prove my case
and disprove yours" is not really a surprise.7 7 That lawyers
should be able to cooperate without major disruption in the
majority of cases, as the RAND Report suggests they do,78 is
remarkable.
III. INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE AND ZEALOUS
ADVOCACY
Litigators' adversariness 79 thus derives conceptually from
the conflict between the parties, their clients. It is inherent in
denials of cooperation are the principal weapons"); Kenneth W. Starr, Law and
Lawyers: The Road to Reform, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (1995) ("In litiga-
tion, pretrial discovery is, and has been, the great battlefield.").
75. This is what I was taught by an early mentor in private practice when
beginning to take and defend depositions. For a description of a similar ap-
proach, see PERLMUTTER, supra note 11, at 59. The potential of such advice to
encourage lawyers defending depositions to cross the line from legitimate be-
havior to speaking objections, interruption and obstruction should be obvious.
76. In his posthumously published memoirs, Arthur Liman wrote,
"Adopted in the federal system in 1938 as a well-intentioned and sensible re-
form, discovery became in my time a weapon lawyers wielded to harass and
bludgeon adversaries into submission or settlement." ARTHUR L. LIMAN,
LAWYER: A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY 234-35 (1998). To the same
end, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980) ("Where the object
always is to beat every ploughshare into a sword, the discovery procedure is
employed variously as weaponry.").
77. Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 480, 482-83 (1958). Furthermore:
Laymen do not view with unbounded enthusiasm the prospect of ex-
pending their time and money in pretrial procedures that are ex-
pressly designed to produce information or evidence to help their ad-
versary's case.... Sometimes sooner, sometimes later, the client's
attitude is translated into his lawyer's actions, and he resists his ad-
versary's discovery demands.
Id.
78. RAND REPORT, supra note 6, at xx, 27.
79. I use the term "adversariness" to refer to partisan opposition or com-
petitiveness of attitude. For litigators' aggression or obstruction, see supra
note 72 and infra Part VIII.
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the essential oppositional nature of litigation, although litiga-
tion through agents may also incite and magnify client liti-
giousness.80 Since the parties' interests are fundamentally
(and until the point of settlement, irreconcilably) in conflict, so
too are the interests of the lawyers, as their agents.81
The discovery rules embodied in Rules 26 through 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose obligations on the par-
ties, not on their counsel. Lawyers should explain to clients the
nature of the discovery process and clients' rights and obliga-
tions under it. Although it is ultimately the client's obligation
to search for and provide responsive information, lawyers tradi-
tionally assist clients in this task and clients often delegate the
conduct of discovery in its entirety to their lawyers. The par-
ticipation of lawyers in discovery creates a direct conflict be-
tween parties' obligations of cooperation and responsiveness
under the discovery rules and lawyers' traditional obligations of
"zealous advocacy" imposed by professional responsibility direc-
tives.
The ideal of zealous advocacy, 82 derived from the fiduciary
obligations of loyalty and confidentiality of the lawyer-agent,
often is invoked to justify adversarial behavior in discovery. A
lawyer "should act with commitment and dedication to the in-
terests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf[,]" according to the official comment to Rule 1.3 of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (the Model Rules).83 Additionally, the lawyer "may take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate
a client's cause or endeavor."84
80. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 19, at 510-11.
81. "Agent" is used here in its technical sense as one who represents and
can bind a principal and who, under prevailing concepts of agency law, has a
fiduciary duty to further the principal's interests. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmt. b, e (1958).
82. According to Professor Simon and others, the mandate of "zealous ad-
vocacy within the bounds of the law" contained in the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility accurately if crudely encapsulates the prevailing ap-
proach to lawyers' ethics, and legitimates (or in some lawyers' views obligates)
the lawyer "in pursuing any arguably lawful goal of the client through any ar-
guably lawful means." WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 7-8
(1998).
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983).
84. Id. Many lawyers understand this to permit any conduct on the cli-
ent's behalf that is not explicitly prohibited. The comparable provision of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, stated, "A lawyer should
represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
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Proficient advocates maximize strategic advantage during
the investigation and discovery phase of pretrial litigation by
obtaining as much relevant and useful information, admissions
and impeachment material as possible from and about the ad-
versary, for potential use at trial, while minimizing information
and admissions obtained by or given to the adversary.85 Law-
yers endeavor to achieve this end in many ways86 including:
propounding wide-ranging, penetrating and comprehensive dis-
covery requests; pursuing them if necessary through motions to
compel discovery; simultaneously asserting all possible objec-
tions in response to adversaries' requests, including those of ir-
relevance, excessive scope and undue burden; construing all of
the opponents' requests narrowly and excluding everything not
directly responsive to them; asserting on the client's behalf all
available privileges as excuses for non-production of docu-
ments, failure to answer interrogatories or instructions not to
answer questions on depositions; and seeking protective orders
to validate any decisions not to answer or produce. Unscrupu-
lous lawyers go further, crossing into rule violations and illegal
behaviors. Examples are coaching witnesses by making as ex-
tensive "speaking objections" during depositions as they can get
away with, and other "dirty tricks" such as scrambling the or-
der of documents produced for inspection and copying and hid-
ing critical documents in unrelated files,87 to say nothing of
downright falsification of discovery responses, or suppression or
destruction of relevant evidence.
Commentators occasionally criticize the behavior of law-
yers using pretrial discovery in aggressively adversarial ways,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Simon notes that although
the Model Rules are less explicit, its advocacy and confidentiality provisions
"amount to almost precisely the same approach as the Code." SIMON, supra
note 82, at 8.
85. There are, of course, additional practical reasons for aggressive be-
havior in discovery, including "sending a message" of various kinds to the op-
posing party and its counsel, e.g., that the party will not capitulate easily, or
that suing the party will result in various expensive and unpleasant conse-
quences.
86. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery, supra note 35,
at 1315-31, for a description of some of the ways in which adversarial norms
influence lawyers' conduct of informal investigations, responses to interrogato-
ries and requests for production of documents, and conduct in depositions.
87. Both of these practices clearly violate Rule 34's directive that docu-
ments produced for inspection and copying may be produced "as they are kept
in the usual course of business[,]" or shall be organized and labeled "to corre-
spond with the categories in the [document] request." FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
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asserting that lawyers have incentives to do so "[blecause in-
vestigation and discovery.., do not take place under the direct
scrutiny of judges,"88 or that lawyers should have a duty to seek
the truth. Such criticism, however, not only mistakes the na-
ture of discovery and the proper role of lawyers in adversarial
litigation but also overlooks the strong support, if not complete
justification, for such aggressively adversarial behavior in pro-
fessional responsibility directives.8 9 Indeed, the pursuit of stra-
tegic informational advantage is what litigation lawyers are
paid to do and finds theoretical support in the ethical admoni-
tion to represent the client zealously and loyally. Insofar as it
involves the minimization of information and material given to
the adversary, pursuit of informational advantage is grounded
both in the lawyer's cardinal duty to keep and preserve the cli-
ent's secrets, and in the evidentiary doctrines of the attorney-
client privilege and attorney's work product.
The duty of confidentiality concerning the client's affairs is
one of the defining characteristics of a lawyer in the American
legal system. Currently contained in Model Rule 1.6 of the
Model Rules, the duty of confidentiality comes both from the
law of agency and, as respects the attorney-client privilege,
from the law of evidence. Rule 1.6 forbids revelation by the
lawyer of information relating to the representation unless: (a)
the client consents; (b) the disclosures are "impliedly author-
ized in order to carry out the representation"; (c) the disclosures
are necessary in order "to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in immi-
nent death or substantial bodily harm"; or (d) the disclosures
serve "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer" in
proceedings involving the lawyer's representation of the client,
including controversies with the client and other civil claims or
criminal charges. 90
Disclosure of information about the client and the client's
affairs is thus within the bounds of permissible disclosure for
discovery only because the rule of client-lawyer confidentiality
88. Crystal, supra note 20, at 726.
89. As a recent article put it, "[t]here is nothing improper about aggres-
sively pursuing discovery. In fact, that is precisely what litigators are paid to
do.... Again, we owe our clients a duty to oppose requests for discovery that
are improperly broad, ambiguous, burdensome, or directed to irrelevant in-
formation." Shugrue, supra note 11, at 11.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 169 (1958).
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theoretically yields in situations in which "a lawyer may be ob-
ligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give informa-
tion about a client."91 Disclosure by the lawyer of information
sought in discovery is permissible, also, by virtue of Rule 1.6's
exception for disclosures "impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation."92
As the official Comment notes, however, there should be a
presumption against supersession of Rule 1.6 by other provi-
sions of law.93 So strong is the obligation of client confidential-
ity that despite the lawyer's duty of candor to the court and
duty to the administration of justice, a lawyer need not disclose
client information to correct factual errors by the court or op-
posing counsel when fraud by the client is not implicated.94
The lawyer's obligation to keep the client's secrets is thus
deep-seated and largely unyielding. Client interest and need,
images enshrined in popular culture and strictures of profes-
sional responsibility all combine to produce a vision of the law-
yer in adversarial litigation as a fighter who will contend tire-
lessly for the client in what is essentially a war, who should
gain every lawful strategic advantage for the client and who is
obliged to protect the client's secrets and confidences to the
greatest extent possible.
Against this vision of the advocate as partisan warrior,
prescriptions of cooperative lawyerly behavior in discovery and
proscriptions of obstructive or dilatory tactics sit most uneas-
ily.95 Such cooperative, anti-obstructive norms are found in two
places: the ethical directives that address the lawyer's respon-
sibilities as an officer of the legal system, and the discovery
rules themselves.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 cmt. 21 (1983).
92. Id. Rule 1.6. Confidentiality stipulations and protective orders thus
help to facilitate discovery, since even though a lawyer has an obligation to
assist a client in responding to discovery by adversaries in litigation, she still
has an obligation to preserve the client's secrets with respect to the rest of the
world and to keep them from being used for purposes beyond the litigation.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 cmt. 21.
94. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(2) (discussing the duty to disclose material facts
and the limits of this duty). In most jurisdictions-Florida, Illinois and Mas-
sachusetts being notable exceptions-the Rules as adopted make no provision
for disclosure of a client confession to a crime even where necessary to show
that another person is being wrongly incarcerated or in danger of execution.
See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 74-78 (Aspen Law & Business 1998).
95. See Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil
Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 19-20 (1988).
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First, prescriptions of cooperation in discovery are founded
in the traditional conception of the lawyer as an officer of the
court, which embodies the notion that lawyers have fiduciary
responsibilities to the court as representative of a larger com-
munity having a vital interest in the administration of justice.
These obligations generally include the duty of forthrightness
and the obligations not to abuse court processes or corrupt the
administration of justice, but rather to conduct cases efficiently
and expeditiously.9 6 Although it is said that the organized bar
historically subordinated the norm of zealous advocacy to pro-
fessional responsibilities to the legal system and the ideal of
justice, it is certain that in the United States today, if not also
since the days of Lord Brougham in England around 1820,97
client interests have come to be exalted in both general bar ide-
ology and the ethics codes. 98
Reported opinions sometimes ground the advocate's duty to
cooperate in discovery in counsel's obligations as an officer of
the court,99 although these obligations are expressed more spe-
cifically in Rules 3.4 and 3.2 of the Model Rules. Rule 3.4, enti-
tled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," proscribes un-
96. See D.A. Ipp, Lawyers' Duties to the Court, 114 LAW Q. REV. 63, 65
(1998).
97. Lord Henry Brougham, who defended Queen Caroline against charges
of adultery, is reported to have told the House of Lords:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in per-
forming this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the de-
struction which he may bring upon others.... [H]e must go on reck-
less of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve
his country in confusion.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821).
98. Professor Gordon has referred to this as the triumph of "the Zealous
Advocacy principle" over "the Justice-Serving principle." Robert W. Gordon, Is
Law Still a Profession? Was it Ever One? And Does it Matter? 12 (Nov. 20,
1998) (unpublished paper presented at the Don Herzog and Rick Pildes Legal
Theory Workshop at the University of Michigan Law School) (on file with
author).
99. See McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d
1482, 1486 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Counsel have an obligation, as officers of the
court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith re-
sponses to legitimate discovery requests."); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc.,
744 F.2d 1464, 1466 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (stating that attorneys
do not meet obligations as officers of court by pre-trial game playing); Smith v.
Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 135 F.R.D. 139, 150 (M.D. La. 1991) (quoting
McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C., 894 F.2d at 1486), rev'd on other
grounds, 960 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1992).
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lawful obstruction of another party's access to evidence or un-
lawful alteration, destruction or concealment of documents or
materials of potential evidentiary value, falsification of evi-
dence, and knowing disobedience of an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal. In pretrial procedure, Rule 3.4 forbids pro-
pounding a frivolous discovery request or failing to try to com-
ply with a discovery request by an opposing party. It notably
does not prohibit all obstruction, alteration, destruction and
concealment (only that which is unlawful), or limit discovery
(except as to that which is "frivolous"), or require prompt com-
pliance with discovery requests (requiring instead, only "rea-
sonably diligent effort[s] to comply with... legally proper dis-
covery request[s]").100
These limitations are consistent with the primary respon-
sibility of counsel (other than prosecutors) to their clients,
rather than to some overarching extrajudicial conception of
"the truth."'' 1 They accord with the responsibility of lawyers,
especially defense counsel, to subvert, conceal or disguise the
truth by lawful means when it is in the client's interests to do
so.10 2 Similarly, Rule 3.2, which requires lawyers to expedite
litigation, does not require unlimited efforts, but only "reason-
able" ones consistent with client interests.10 3 The Legal Back-
ground to Rule 3.4 recognizes that there are sound reasons to
pursue legitimate tactics that may have the effect of lengthen-
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a)-(d) (1983). As
Professor Rhode has aptly noted, "the Model Rules do little more than incorpo-
rate general prohibitions on crime and fraud." Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Per-
spectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 601 (1985).
101. See The Worrying Zeal of Ken Starr, ECONOMIST, June 6, 1998, at 32
(quoting view of Kenneth Starr that "lawyers have a duty not to use their
skills to impede the search for truth" and response of leading legal ethics ex-
pert Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. that Starr's assertion "is not only ludi-
crous; it is pernicious").
102. See id.
103. Model Rule 3.2, entitled "Expediting Litigation", states: "A lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the inter-
ests of the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2. The
official comment explains that the test is "whether a competent lawyer acting
in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial
purpose other than delay[,]" and notes further that "[rlealizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate
interest of the client." Id. cmt. Although professional responsibility treatises
accept this position without question, see, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 599-600 (1986), it may be doubted whether it would
meet with significant (much less universal) acceptance among practicing law-
yers.
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ing a lawsuit, but distinguishes them from abusive attempts to
cause unreasonable delay.'0 4
Lawyers' duties to the court, the legal system, and an over-
arching conception of justice or truth are thus generally subor-
dinated to duties to clients.'0 5 Similarly, courts recognize that
the exhortations and admonitions contained in professional
ethical rules and codes, whether or not cast as mandatory, "are
primarily aspirational[,] " 10 6 "symbolic and pedagogic."10 7
The other main source of lawyers' duties to cooperate in
discovery is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves.
When the Rules provided a host of new discovery devices in
1938, they took for granted, or at least did not explicitly ad-
dress, a lawyer's duty to cooperate in the discovery process.
Such a duty was introduced obliquely into the rules by the 1983
and 1993 amendments. In 1983, the Rules were amended to
add Rule 26(g), which imposed a signing obligation for discov-
ery requests, responses and objections parallel to that required
of other court papers by Rule 11.108 Similarly, the 1993
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d) cmt.
105. See Rhode, supra note 100, at 600-01; see also Blaner et al., supra note
8, at 9 ("Under the ethics rules, the attorney's primary obligation is to the cli-
ent, not the court."). For a contrary view, see William W. Schwarzer, The Fed-
eral Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
703, 720-21 (1989).
106. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482,
1487 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting The Texas Lawyers' Creed-A Mandate for
Professionalism (1989), reprinted in 52 TEX. B.J. 1304, 1304-05 (1989)).
107. Rhode, supra note 100, at 647. Notwithstanding the patent efficacy
limitations of professional responsibility norms, some courts treat counsel's
duty to cooperate in discovery as based in professional responsibility directives
or refer to it as an ethical duty. See, e.g., Higgins v. Lufi, 353 N.W.2d 150, 155
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing how attorneys have an ethical duty to coop-
erate in discovery).
108. Rule 26(g), as amended, provides:
(g) Signing of Disclosures, Discovery Requests, Responses, and Objec-
tions.
(1) Every disclosure made pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) or subdi-
vision (a)(3) shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. An unrep-
resented party shall sign the disclosure and state the party's address.
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that
to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after a reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of
the time it is made.
(2) Every discovery request, response, or objection made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one at-
torney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the request, re-
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amendments altered the existing provision of Rule 26(f) for ju-
dicial intervention through a discovery conference by requiring
the attorneys of record and unrepresented parties to meet to at-
tempt in good faith to frame a discovery plan prior to the Rule
16 status and scheduling conference held by the court. 10 9 Ac-
cording to the Advisory Committee Comment, Rule 26(g) im-
poses "an affirmative duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a
responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and pur-
poses" of the discovery rules. 110 Absent a more detailed exposi-
tion of this duty, however, this prescription is not only vague,
sponse, or objection and state the party's address. The signature of
the attorney or party constitutes a certification that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable
inquiry, the request, response, or objection is:
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law;
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive,
given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation.
If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the atten-
tion of the party making the request, response, or objection, and a
party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until
it is signed.
(3) If without substantial justification a certification is made in
violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on
whose behalf the disclosure, request, response, or objection is made,
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the viola-
tion, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
109. According to Rule 26(f):
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have ap-
peared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging and being pre-
sent or represented at the meeting, for attempting in good faith to
agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court
within 10 days after the meeting a written report outlining the plan.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3), advisory committee comments to the 1983
amendments. The certification duty 'requires the lawyer to pause and con-
sider the reasonableness of his request, response or objection." Id. It does not
require the signing lawyer to certify "the truthfulness of the client's factual
responses[,]" merely "that the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure
that the client has provided all the information and documents available that
are responsive to the discovery demand." Id.
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but weak. Despite Rule 26(g)(3)'s directive that district courts
"shall impose... an appropriate sanction""1 upon violators,
the provision appears hardly to be used,112 at least in the sense
that although lawyers sign discovery requests and responses
routinely, proceedings for sanctions pursuant to Rule 26(g)(3)
are rarely if ever reported.'" 3
In addition to the courts that base the lawyer's duty to co-
operate in discovery either in counsel's obligations as an officer
of the court or in the ethical rules, some base it in the discovery
rules," 4 while still others do not advert to its source. 115 Re-
gardless of the source ascribed to the lawyer's duty to cooperate
in the discovery process, however, few reported opinions ana-
lyze the duty, and none that I have found do so incisively or in
depth. This dearth of judicial analysis may result from the un-
comfortable truths that the duty to cooperate in discovery con-
flicts directly with the lawyer's responsibility to the client,116
that courts have as much trouble reconciling the conflict as do
advocates, and that they therefore do not like to think about
the problem.
111. Id.
112. A search of Westlaw's Allfeds database revealed only 19 reported
opinions referring to Rule 26(g)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
113. Since Rule 26(g)(3) provides mandatory rather than permissive sanc-
tions for violations, one might expect experience with the Rule to approximate
the courts' experience with Rule 11, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
between 1983 and 1993, when it provided mandatory rather than permissive
imposition of sanctions and generated large amounts of satellite litigation.
See, e.g., Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858
P.2d 1054, 1083 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (finding that attorneys violated certifi-
cation requirement for discovery responses equivalent to Rule 26(g) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
114. See Airtex Corp. v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 154 (7th
Cir. 1976) (finding that an answer did not comport with duty of cooperation
and disclosure imposed by discovery provisions of federal rules); Ritter v. Dia-
sonics, Inc., No. 91-7660, 1992 WL 164905, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give the trial court the power to impose sanctions for
parties' failure to cooperate in discovery."), rev'd on other grounds, 993 F.2d
225 (3d Cir. 1993).
115. See Mungin v. Stephens, 164 F.R.D. 275, 279 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (court
instructed plaintiff regarding "duty to cooperate fully in discovery"); Zinn v.
Leach, Nos. 90-A-03, 90-CA-08, 1990 WL 187466, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing attorneys' duty to cooperate in discovery).
116. Professor Resnik has referred to the "contradictory mandates" of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that "a discovery system ('give your
opponent all information relevant to the litigation') was grafted onto American
adversarial norms ('protect your client zealously' and therefore 'Withhold what
you can')." Resnik, supra note 14, at 378.
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First, the duty to cooperate in discovery clashes directly
with the lawyer's obligation to contend zealously for the client
that is epitomized both in the norm of lawyerly adversariness
and the fiduciary duty of loyalty.117 At the most practical level,
by disclosing information or documents in the client's posses-
sion that are responsive to an adversary's discovery requests,
the lawyer may give up material that will assist adversary par-
ties. This obviously diminishes the client's interests and con-
flicts with the lawyer's obligation to further them.
Second, in being required to divulge information about the
client and the client's affairs that is not publicly known, the
lawyer must act in a manner directly at odds with the lawyer's
fiduciary duty of confidentiality. As noted above, the lawyer's
duty to keep secrets is subject to exceptions concerning infor-
mation required to be divulged by other provisions of law, evi-
dence sought under compulsion of legal process and disclosures
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, each of
which allows the duty to keep secrets to be viewed as subordi-
nate to the lawyer's discovery obligations. Were it not for these
exceptions, the conflict between discovery obligations and the
duty of confidentiality would be theoretically irreconcilable as
well as practically intractable.
Lawyers' efforts to obtain strategic informational advan-
tage on behalf of their clients are therefore not only motivated
by client inducements. They are thoroughly grounded in fun-
damental professional responsibility directives of loyalty and
confidentiality to the client that many lawyers take to pre-
dominate over norms of cooperation and responsibilities to the
court, the truth, the profession and the legal system. Thus, as
long as lawyers can justify or rationalize stretching and vio-
lating the discovery rules in the name of zealous advocacy for
117. No less an authority than Judge Schwarzer has written:
Contrary to a common perception among lawyers, there is no inherent
conflict between the lawyer's duty to the client and the duty to the
system-the obligation owed as an officer of the court. The obligation
of zealous representation owed the client can and should be carried
out within the justice system, and hence within the limits imposed by
the obligation to preserve and protect the integrity of that system. To
acknowledge that limitation on the duty owed to the client need not
eviscerate the adversary process in its proper place, for... it is
premised on an institutional framework rather than on the measure
of adversarial confrontation.
Schwarzer, supra note 105, at 720-21. With all due respect to Judge Schwar-
zer, this is simply wrong. To conclude that one set of duties, norms or pre-
scriptions should yield to another does not mean that they do not conflict.
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their clients, discovery problems in complex and high-stakes
cases will remain a familiar part of the legal landscape." 8
IV. DISCOVERY'S FUNCTIONS IN A SYSTEM OF NOTICE
PLEADING
A critic of excessive discovery stated a decade ago: "For
many lawyers, discovery is a Pavlovian reaction. When a law-
suit is filed, and the filing stamp comes down, the word proces-
sor begins to grind out interrogatories and requests for produc-
tion. Deposition notices drop like autumn leaves."" 9 Putting
aside Judge Schwarzer's unflattering implication that lawyers
are conditioned to behave reflexively like drooling dogs, 120 com-
prehensive discovery energetically undertaken and vigorously
pursued is precisely what lawyers in pretrial litigation are sup-
posed to do. Indeed, failing to take discovery in any case but
one in which all the facts are known and indisputable is often
criticized as highly suspect if not outright malpractice and is
viewed universally as more serious dereliction than discovering
too much.121
Since 1938, our system of adjudication has endeavored to
promote adjudications and settlements based on the merits
over those with results determined by pleading technicalities
and information asymmetries. In the regime created by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, wide-ranging discovery plays
a critical and distinctive role. Specifically, it performs the func-
tions of determining the facts each party believes to exist and
118. Cf. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery, supra note 35,
at 1347. Brazil states:
Without major changes in the adversary rules that shape the pretrial
environment, there can be no effective judicial control of discovery. If
the rules of the adversary game are left essentially intact, interjecting
a judicial officer into the discovery process will simply add another
adversary (the court) to the combat. Counsel and clients will continue
to conceal material evidence until clearly compelled to divulge it, re-
sist disclosure of damaging information, and seek ways to gain advan-
tages over opponents through the use of discovery tools.
Id.
119. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REPORT, supra note 60, at 7 (quoting Judge
William Schwarzer).
120. To the extent that Judge Schwarzer had in mind unthinking discov-
ery, as well as the "one size fits all" mentality often exemplified by word-
processor-generated discovery requests, his criticism is well taken.
121. See In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1987); Aldrich v.
Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 631-37 (11th Cir. 1985); McClung v. Smith, 870 F.
Supp. 1384, 1404-05 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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narrowing the issues in dispute (or sometimes broadening
them).122 It is beyond serious dispute that discovery performs
these functions more fairly and efficiently than they were per-
formed traditionally by pleadings. 123 Since unsubstantiated
claims and defenses may be winnowed out through summary
judgment, pleadings need only provide adversaries with fair
notice of the parties' claims and defenses. Liberal discovery
thus allows pleadings to be "generalized statements." 124 A
complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears on its face
that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle
him to relief.125 In order to work satisfactorily, "notice plead-
ing" requires liberal, free-ranging discovery.
In routine litigations with few parties, conventional legal
theories, limited possible factual variations and few fact wit-
nesses, notice pleading and liberal discovery need not create
problems. The greater the generality with which claims are
pleaded, however, the more liberal and searching must be the
discovery permitted. 126 Otherwise, surprises at trial would re-
turn as the norm rather than the exception; parties would not
be required to commit to positions on the facts ordinarily in ad-
vance of trial; and other devices, such as pleadings, motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment would have to be
used to narrow issues to those that truly require trials.
The more generalized the statement of claim or defense
permitted, however, the more difficult it is for courts to decide
when information sought by the parties is or is not "relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action" or "reasona-
bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence."' 27 Thus, paradoxically, the more liberal and searching
the discovery needed because of the generality of pleading or
122. Pre-trial conferences and partial summary judgment can also be used
to narrow issues.
123. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 468 (5th ed.
1994).
124. Patrick E. Higginbotham, General Provisions Governing Discovery;
Duty of Disclosure, 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3D § 26.02, at 26-26 (1999);
see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
125. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 47-48; Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
126. See EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 68, at 77-78.
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Judicial decisions about when discovery
sought is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence" are much easier in fact pleading than in notice pleading regimes, since
complaints are richer in factual detail.
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complexity of the case, the less it may be obviously relevant to
or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence about
matters suggested by the pleadings. Additionally, the more
litigants attempt to frame issues in a manner favorable to
themselves, the greater the likelihood that disputes over the
scope of permissible discovery will ensue. 128
These generalizations apply with even greater force when
litigation is complex, or when the legal basis for the claim or
defense is novel or unfamiliar. As noted above, civil lawsuits
today are frequently larger and much more complex than dur-
ing the early years of the Federal Rules. 129 Changes in law,
novelty of claims or defenses, doctrinal subtlety or complexity,
increases in the number of parties, increases in the quantity of
alternative or hypothetical theories asserted, all tend to require
wider-ranging discovery; hence they produce more squabbles
about what discovery should be permissible130 and about privi-
lege.
From time to time, frustration with the expense and dis-
ruption caused by discovery prompts calls, typically from the
defense bar and business interests but sometimes from judges
as well, for curtailment of the scope of discovery and a rever-
sion to more particularized pleading of facts. At the National
Conference on Discovery Reform in 1982, for example, Judge
Gerard L. Goettel of the Southern District of New York stated:
"[Tihe rules as presently written give tremendous latitude to
discovery. It was a mistake not to reduce that latitude, as pro-
posed a few years ago, so that there would be a point at which
it could be said that certain discovery is too peripheral, and is
not necessary."131
128. See GLASER, supra note 20, at 161.
129. See supra pp. 519-20.
130. See Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial
Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanc-
tions, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 873, 879; see also Frank H. Easterbrook,
Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 641 (1989).
131. The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIG. 89, 117 (1982). Although
Judge Goettel did not specifically identify the proposal he had in mind, in all
likelihood it was that advanced in 1977 by a Special Committee of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Section of Litigation to limit the scope of discovery to "is-
sues raised by the claims or defenses of any party." PRELIMINARY DRAFT, su-
pra note 21, at 9-10; see also ACF Indus. Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting letter from
Hon. Griffin Bell that in his experience as a judge, practicing lawyer and At-
torney General of the United States, the scope of discovery is far too broad).
536 [Vol. 84:505
CIVIL DISCOVERY'S FATAL FLAWS
More successfully from the perspective of curtailing discov-
ery, an alliance of interests from the high-tech industries and
large accounting firms successfully lobbied Congress in 1995 to
pass the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 132 over Presi-
dent Clinton's veto. Among other procedural provisions specifi-
cally for securities fraud lawsuits, the Reform Act raised the
standard of factual particularity with which fraud in the issu-
ance or sale of securities must be pleaded in a complaint. It
also provided for a moratorium on all discovery, beginning
when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed, until its deci-
sion. Although there is continuing debate about the supposed
merits of the Reform Act and its departure from principles of
"trans-substantive" procedure, there is little question about the
immediate effect of these essentially pro-defendant provisions.
Because the facts constituting suspected fraud and the evi-
dence necessary to prove it typically are within the exclusive
knowledge and control of defendants, the Reform Act makes it
much more difficult both for complaints alleging securities
fraud to survive motions to dismiss and for plaintiffs in securi-
ties fraud cases in federal court to obtain discovery at all.
In 1998, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published
for comment a draft of proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 33 After receiving comments and
holding hearings, in April 1999 the Advisory Committee ap-
proved the proposed amendments, with minor revisions, 134 and
132. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
133. PRELIM NARY DRAFT, supra note 21. Its proposals included: elimina-
tion of the opt-out authorization from the automatic disclosure procedure in
Rule 26(a)(1) as well as limitation of the scope of required automatic disclo-
sure; elimination of the authorization in Rule 26(b)(2) for local rules altering
presumptive national limits on frequency or duration of discovery requests;
amendment of the discovery moratorium of Rule 26(d) so that the parties can
immediately commence discovery in cases to which initial disclosure does not
apply; amendment of Rule 26(f)'s provision for a face-to-face discovery confer-
ence to one that could occur by telephone or video conferencing; addition of a
presumptive limit of one seven-hour day on depositions; and sanctions for fail-
ure to supplement discovery responses under Rule 26(d)(2). See id. at 34-59.
The Preliminary Draft also contained another proposed change, making ex-
plicit court power to allow a party to pursue a discovery request that otherwise
would violate the limit of Rule 26(b) on condition that the requesting party pay
part or all of the reasonable costs of responding, however, this proposal, after
being approved by both the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, was not approved by
the Judicial Conference of the United States. See infra notes 134-36.
134. See Memorandum from the Honorable Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair,
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on June 14 and 15, 1999, the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure approved a proposal that the amend-
ments be forwarded to the Judicial Conference of the United
States with a recommendation for adoption of the proposed rule
changes. 135 At its meeting on September 15 and 16, 1999, the
Judicial Conference of the United States considered the pro-
posed amendments and, except for one provision not relevant to
this discussion, approved them.136 If the Supreme Court ap-
proves them by the end of April 2000, the amendments will
take effect on December 1, 2000 unless they are disapproved by
Congress before that time.137
One of the most controversial of the proposed amendments
would alter Rule 26(b)(1), concerning the scope and limits of
discovery. Specifically, it would amend the rule by changing
the relevance referent that presently governs discovery's scope
and limits, "[p]arties may obtain discovery of any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party[,]" to "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense
of any party."138 Furthermore, the proposed amendments
would add the sentence, "For good cause shown, the court may
order discovery of any information relevant to the subject mat-
ter involved in the action."139
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (May 11, 1999) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Niemeyer Memorandum].
135. See E-mail from Professor Thomas Rowe to Law Faculty Discussion
List on Civil Procedure (July 26, 1999) (on file with author).
136. See E-mail from Professor Thomas Rowe to Law Faculty Discussion
List on Civil Procedure (Sept. 15, 1999) (on file with author). According to the
Rules Committee Support Office at the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, the Judicial Conference "'voted to approve, with one exception,
all the rule amendments recommended by the Standing Rules Committee. The
Conference rejected the proposed amendments to Civil Rule 26(b)(2) dealing
with cost bearing. Long discussions were held on the Civil Rules' initial-
disclosure and scope-of-discovery proposals, and the votes approving these two
proposals were extremely close."' Id. (quoting a report on the Conference's ac-
tion).
137. See id.
138. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra
note 21, at 81-82.
139. Id. at 83.
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In the Introduction to the Preliminary Draft, the Advisory
Committee described this change1 40 as attempting to divide dis-
covery as it presently exists into attorney-managed discovery,
which would have to be relevant to claims and defenses stated
in the pleadings, and court-managed discovery, which could be
relevant to the subject matter of the action upon good cause
shown.141 The official Committee Note explained the change as
follows:
The Amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in
regulating the breadth of discovery in cases involving sweeping or
contentious discovery. The Committee has been informed repeatedly
by lawyers that involvement of the court in managing discovery is an
important method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad
discovery. Increasing the availability-of judicial officers to resolve
discovery disputes and increasing court management of discovery
were both strongly endorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal
Judicial Center. Under the amended provisions, if there is an objec-
tion that discovery goes beyond material relevant to the claims or de-
fenses, the court would become involved to determine whether the
discovery is relevant to the claims or defenses and, if not, whether
good cause exists for authorizing it so long as it is relevant to the
subject matter of the action. The good-cause standard warranting
broader discovery is meant to be flexible.
The Committee intends to focus the parties and the court on the
actual claims and defenses involved in the action. The dividing line
between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that
relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined
with precision. However, the rule change signals to the court that it
has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses as-
serted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are
not already identified in the pleadings. In general, it is hoped that
reasonable lawyers can cooperate to manage discovery without the
need for judicial intervention. When judicial intervention is invoked,
the actual scope of discovery should be determined according to the
reasonable needs of the action. The court may permit broader discov-
ery in a particular case depending on the circumstances of the case,
the nature of the claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery
requested.
14 2
Whether the amendment would achieve its desired end, if
approved by the Supreme Court, is doubtful at best. The Advi-
140. The Advisory Committee traces the ancestry of this proposal back to a
proposal to amend the rule made in 1978 by the American Bar Association's
Section of Litigation and renewed from time to time by different bar groups,
most recently by the American College of Trial Lawyers. See PRELIMINARY
DRAFT, supra note 21, at 9-10, 54; see also supra note 131.
141. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 21, at 4.
142. Id. at 55-56 (citation omitted).
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sory Committee suggested that the revision was not intended to
change the scope of available discovery so much as to change
the presumption to the need for court approval for discovery
ranging beyond the claims and defenses in the pleadings. 143
Because federal district courts today already have the power to
limit discovery to protect parties or other persons from "annoy-
ance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense," 144 however, and because since 1970 it already has been
the responsibility of the party seeking discovery to seek orders
to compel recalcitrant respondents to provide discovery, it is
not clear why this change should be necessary.
To the extent that its proponents believe that the amend-
ment would change real-world discovery practice, their view
that the parties should not be entitled ordinarily to explore
matters not obviously and specifically relevant to claims and
defenses stated in the pleadings suggests a fundamental, reac-
tionary departure from the orthodox view of the respective
functions of discovery and pleading long accepted by the Su-
preme Court. As Justice Powell, a committed opponent of dis-
covery excess, wrote for a unanimous Court in 1978:
The key phrase in this definition [from Rule 26(b)(1)]-"relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action"-has been con-
strued broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that rea-
sonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that
is or may be in the case. Consistently with the notice-pleading system
established by the Rules, discovery is not limited to issues raised by
pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the
issues.
145
Justice Powell also quoted Moore's Federal Practice for the
proposition that "[t]he court should and ordinarily does inter-
pret 'relevant' very broadly to mean matter that is relevani to
anything that is or may become an issue in the litigation."146
There are other problems with the amendment, 147 besides
its radical, pro-defendant 48 novelty. First, as the quotation
143. See id.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177
(1979).
145. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (emphasis added); see also Klono-
ski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 267 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Mary
Hitchcock Mem' Hosp. v. Klonoski, 119 S. Ct. 1334 (1999); Gomez v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351 (quoting 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 26.56[1], at 26-131 n.34 (2d ed. 1976)).
147. As students of legal change are aware, the unintended consequences
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from the Committee's note reveals, the amendment offers no
guidance whatsoever for determining the point at which re-
quested discovery should be deemed relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action, without being relevant to the
claims and defenses of any party. Second, it offers no assis-
tance in determining what constitutes "good cause" that should
be sufficient for a judge to justify granting discovery relevant to
the subject matter of the action rather than simply to the
claims and defenses of the parties. Third, since defense law-
yers would use the amended scope provisions to resist discovery
to an even greater extent than they do already, an immediate
effect of the proposed amendment would likely be to increase
the number of discovery disputes that result in motions to com-
pel and thus require judicial intervention. In view of the low
likelihood that such intervention would be forthcoming (espe-
cially in view of the history of unsuccessful calls for judicial in-
tervention over the past forty years),149 one may be forgiven for
being less than sanguine about the proposed amendment's ef-
fects.
Fourth and even more troubling, however, would be an-
other unintended but likely consequence of the amendment: the
effective abandonment by the federal courts of the philosophy
of "notice pleading" and a return to "fact pleading," with all of
the problems associated with it. Lawyers cannot predict with
precision where useful evidence will be found or when they
have enough of it, 150 especially in complex and high-stakes
cases. As noted above, although lawyers need liberal discovery
in order to pursue factual support for clients' claims where
claims and defenses have been pleaded in generalized state-
ments, the danger exists that the relevance of any given discov-
ery sought might not be obvious to adversaries or to a court
that must rule on motions to compel or motions for protective
orders.
of legislation or rulemaking are often even more significant than the intended
effects.
148. The proposal favors defendants for at least two reasons. First, plain-
tiffs typically need more discovery than do defendants, and the restricted
scope of "attorney-managed" discovery will facilitate narrowing and resisting
discovery by defendants. Second, the proposal's indirect effects on pleadings,
namely that it will require plaintiffs' lawyers to aver the circumstances giving
rise to claims in greater detail if discovery is to be available, will give addi-
tional particularized notice to defendants.
149. See infra Part VII.
150. See Easterbrook, supra note 130, at 641.
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Limiting discovery to matters relevant to the claims and
defenses of the parties therefore would require lawyers (mainly
plaintiffs' lawyers) to aver the circumstances giving rise to the
claims and defenses (mainly claims) much more specifically
than is required today. This probable but unintended 151 conse-
quence of the proposed amendment of Rule 26(b) would thus
aid defendants and effect a radical departure from notice
pleading traditions enshrined both in the philosophy of Rule
8(a) and in such venerable cases as Conley v. Gibson. 52 Al-
though these consequences were stressed repeatedly through-
out the proceedings of the Advisory Committee, especially in
the public comments, 153 they did not suffice to dissuade both
the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure from ultimately recommending the
proposal, 154 or the Judicial Conference of the United States
from approving it.
The Committee offers no reason to think that reducing the
scope of discovery available without court order will have the
desired effect of reducing discovery disputes and expense in
complex and high-stakes cases. Undoubtedly, generalized
statements of claim and wide-ranging discovery required by the
philosophy of notice pleading and sanctioned by venerable
cases interpreting Rules 8(a)155 and Rule 26(b)(1) contribute to
the adversarial friction apparent in discovery disputes. Re-
ducing the scope of discovery, however, will exacerbate, not
ameliorate, the problem, as well as begin to transform our pro-
cedural system back to a fact-pleading system that too easily
151. Since the proposals for this revision have come mainly from the de-
fense bar through the years, I use the term "unintended" to refer presump-
tively to the Advisory Committee, not to the proposal's originators and boost-
ers.
152. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
153. I am grateful to Professor Edward H. Cooper, Reporter to the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, for this information. See Summary of Public
Comments on the Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Civil
Rules Regarding Discovery 1998-99, at 74-121 (unpublished report prepared
by Professor Richard L. Marcus, Reporter to the Discovery Subcommittee of
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) (on file with author).
154. See Niemeyer Memorandum, supra note 134, at 5-6. One member of
the Advisory Committee, Professor Thomas Rowe, moved to abandon the pro-
posed change to Rule 26(b)(1) relating to the scope of discovery, however, fol-
lowing debate, the Committee voted 9-4 against the motion, thus to continue
with the Proposed Amendment as it relates to the scope of discovery. See id.
155. Rule 8(a) provides in relevant part: "A pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief.., shall contain... (2) a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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disposes of disputes on the basis of technicalities rather than
merits. 56
V. DISCOVERY AND COST INTERNALIZATION
One consequence of discovery flows from the value of in-
formation gleaned, while another derives from the burden dis-
covery inflicts on the respondent. Writers from law and eco-
nomics sometimes characterize these values or effects as
"informational" on one hand and "impositional" on the other, 57
and observe that both enhance the settlement value of the dis-
covery proponent's position. Their analysis assumes not only
that informational benefits of discovery flow exclusively to the
requesting party but also that impositional effects, the costs of
discovery, are born to a much greater degree by the discovery
respondent than the proponent, since in general it is easier and
cheaper to propound discovery requests than to respond to
them.158 To put it another way, the requester receives not only
all of the informational benefits from discovery, but also impo-
sitional benefits in the form of expenses imposed on the re-
sponder. 59 The ability of litigants under the Federal Rules to
"externalize" discovery costs results, it is sometimes said, in
"socially inefficient" levels of discovery. 60
156. It is possible to argue that liberal discovery of facts relevant to the
subject matter of an action permits commencement of litigation based on little
more than well-founded suspicion. "Subject-matter-relevant" discovery thus
assists private enforcement of complex regimes of public law, such as federal
securities law, civil rights law, and antitrust law, to name but three examples.
Undoubtedly discovery of facts relevant to the subject matter of a claim or de-
fense allows plaintiffs to develop and piggy-back claims discovered after com-
mencement of an action on claims known prior to commencement. Defendants
opposed to the underlying law thus may have added incentives to obstruct and
resist discovery. Moving back from the standard of "subject-matter-relevant"
discovery would reduce the possibility of leveraging known into unknown
claims, but unless one believes that discovery should permit fishing expedi-
tions, that may well not be a bad thing. Regardless, it is beyond the scope of
this Article.
157. See Setear, supra note 52, at 581-82; see also Easterbrook, supra note
130, at 637-38 (distinguishing "normal" discovery requests, i.e. informational,
from "impositional" discovery requests).
158. See Easterbrook, supra note 130, at 645 ("Impositional discovery de-
pends on asymmetric stakes; the requester incurs lower costs than the person
interrogated.").
159. See Setear, supra note 52, at 580-81.
160. John K. Setear, Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules:
Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 353, 357 (1982). The analysis defines a
"socially efficient" level of discovery by hypothesizing a litigant who both re-
ceives all the benefits from discovery and must incur all its costs. Id. at 357.
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Professors Robert Cooter and Daniel Rubinfeld recently
have taken the economic analysis several steps further. First,
what some have called "social inefficiency," Cooter and Rubin-
feld label "misuse" of discovery. Litigants "misuse" discovery,
they assert, when the costs of responding to discovery exceed
the expected increase in value to the proponent's case. 161 Sec-
ond, knowingly "misusing" discovery, according to Cooter and
Rubinfeld, constitutes discovery "abuse."162 In permitting par-
ties to externalize their discovery costs, their analysis con-
cludes, "current law promotes discovery misuse and abuse." 163
Additionally, Cooter and Rubinfeld assert, because discovery
costs are not shared equally between the parties to litigation,
results of settlements are skewed in an inequitable manner. 164
In order to cure these problems, Cooter and Rubinfeld pro-
pose a two-part cost-shifting rule. 165 Each party would be re-
quired to pay its own costs of discovery (including compliance)
up to a level prescribed by law. 166 Beyond the prescribed level,
however, the reasonable cost of compliance would be shifted to
Such a litigant would only take a particular discovery step if its benefits to
him exceeded its costs. See id. Because litigants under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are able routinely to externalize costs of discovery, they have
an incentive to take discovery in socially inefficient amounts. See id. This as-
serted problem of socially excessive discovery is intensified, it is said, by the
fact that litigants are represented by lawyers who gain benefits from discovery
that do not accrue to the client while they incur few of the costs. See id. at
357-58.
161. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, supra
note 18, at 437. In Setear's terminology, this is when discovery's impositional
effects exceed its informational benefits. See Setear, supra note 52, at 581-83.
162. Cooter & Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, supra
note 18, at 437.
163. Id.
164. See id. They reason:
When the parties agree to settle a dispute by dividing the bar-
gaining surplus equally, the settlement corresponds to the expected
judgment in the event of a trial, provided that the transaction costs of
dispute resolution are equal for the two parties. In contrast, asym-
metrical transaction costs distort the terms of settlement so that they
do not correspond to the expected trial judgment. For example, if the
plaintiff faces lower trial costs than the defendant, then the plaintiff
can demand more than the expected judgment to settle the case.
Id.; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, supra
note 18, at 62 ("Equalizing discovery costs eliminates distortions in bargaining
power between the parties and promotes fairness.").
165. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, supra
note 18, at 71.
166. See id.
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the requesting party.167 The resulting cost internalization
would result in parties only making discovery requests that are
essential to their claims and defenses and forgoing requests
that are "marginal," hence dispensable. 168
As theoretically elegant and attractive as this critique and
proposal may appear, they are based on several misleading as-
sumptions about the operation of discovery in practice that
would be surprising but for the fact that their authors are
economists rather than lawyers. First, although economic
analysis is enlightening as to whether activities are "efficient"
or "inefficient," it offers no guide for determining when discov-
ery activities should be regarded as "misuse" or "abuse." Such
concepts are essentially value judgments that implicate and
should be informed by other policy considerations, including
the size and complexity of the lawsuit, the potential merits of
the claims and defenses, the parties' access to information, and
their respective abilities to bear the costs of the process.
Second, litigants' ability to "externalize" the costs of dis-
covery is not as great as Cooter and Rubinfeld suppose, since
the informational value of discovery does not flow entirely or
even disproportionately to the requesting party. In the "notice
pleading" regime of the Federal Rules, in which discovery
rather than the pleadings bear a significant part of the burden
of narrowing issues, both parties benefit from clarification and
specification of the factual and legal contentions in dispute.
Discovery sometimes is used not to unearth information, but in
fact to bring it to the attention of the adversary in order to
promote a settlement. For example, in complex multi-party
cases, it is not uncommon at some point for plaintiffs' lawyers
to use a deposition of a defendant to parade strong documen-
tary evidence that plaintiffs have discovered, ostensibly to ask
the witness about it, but in fact to inform the assembled de-
fense lawyers that, in light of the evidence being paraded at the
deposition, they would be ill-advised to take the case to trial.
Informational benefits in such cases go from the requesting to
the responding party, not vice versa.
Professors Cooter and Rubinfeld systematically exaggerate
the disparity between the costs of discovery borne by propo-
nents and respondents. It should of course be less time-
consuming to draft a set of interrogatories than to answer
167. See id.
168. Id. at 71-72.
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them, to draft a request for production of documents than to
search for and produce the requested documents, to draft a
deposition notice than to be deposed in response to the notice.
However, to generalize from these facts that it is more expen-
sive to respond to discovery than to propound it and that costs
are therefore borne disproportionately by respondents com-
pletely ignores the time and effort customarily spent by discov-
ery-requesting lawyers. They must design a discovery pro-
gram, draft discovery requests, review documents produced by
respondents, plan and outline depositions, prepare to take
them (including arranging exhibits), take them, and analyze in-
formation disclosed or material produced in response to discov-
ery requests, including requests for document production, in-
terrogatories, deposition questions and requests for admission.
In addition, lawyers for plaintiffs, including government agen-
cies, often conduct extensive and expensive prefiling investiga-
tions. Taking discovery involves more than just spitting out
requests on the word processor.
Although the respective costs to the parties ultimately pre-
sent an empirical question,' 69 it would be surprising if in many
cases these additional expenditures of time and effort by dis-
covery proponents did not approach the time spent by respon-
dents answering interrogatories, reviewing documents in order
to produce them or in preparing witnesses for depositions and
being deposed. Because the informational benefits litigants
glean from discovery responses often depend on additional ef-
forts by requesting lawyers, 70 it is fair to assume much greater
correspondence between the costs of discovery to proponents
and respondents than Cooter and Rubinfeld and other litigation
commentators 171 take into account.
A third problem with Cooter and Rubinfeld's proposal is
that when a lawyer requests discovery in a lawsuit, there is ab-
169. Lawyers for discovery respondents-particularly defendants-may, of
course, review for responsiveness, privilege and work product far more mate-
rial than they ultimately produce, and often are heard to complain that they
routinely produce hundreds of thousands of pages of requested materials that
the requesting lawyers never even inspect.
170. As Professor Cooper has put it, "[tihe actual value of information will
depend on many factors, including the relative astuteness of the person who
gains it." Cooper, supra note 2, at 467.
171. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Set-
tlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 548 (1991); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 17.
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solutely no way for her to calculate ex ante the increased likeli-
hood of success that will result from the discovery requested, or
to weigh it against her adversary's costs of compliance or re-
sponse. It is ordinarily impossible to know with anything ap-
proaching precision what discovery will reveal or how valuable
it will be. As Judge Easterbrook-no fan of abusive litigation-
has described it:
Lawyers cannot limit their search for information in discovery, be-
cause they do not know what they are looking for. They do not know
when to stop, because they never know when they have enough....
When the stakes are high-and often the stakes for corporations are
many times the ad damnum of the complaint-it is worthwhile to in-
vest the legal resources needed to produce even a small change in the
probable outcome. Lawyers practicing in good faith, therefore, engage
in extensive discovery; anything less is foolish.'"
If one knew in advance the results of discovery requests, it
would not be necessary to make them. Given the lack of speci-
ficity with which parties are allowed to plead in a notice
pleading regime, lawyers must use discovery broadly, initially
to determine what are the areas of dispute or contention in the
lawsuit, and then to try to provide factual support for each of
the party's material factual assertions that remains in dispute.
Fourth, although in economic terms there is a sense in
which any item of evidence disclosed in discovery might theo-
retically increase a party's likelihood of success on a claim or
defense by a few percent, in a legal analysis the only difference
that matters is the difference between prevailing or not pre-
vailing, winning or losing. With respect to ordinary civil mat-
ters in which the standard is proof "by a preponderance of the
evidence" this is the difference, typically, between forty-nine
and fifty-one percent. Any item of evidence that tends to prove
or disprove any of the essential elements of a claim or defense,
without which the party cannot meet its burden of proof, has
the potential to make this critical two-percent difference. As a
practical matter, therefore, even a small increase in proof
translates into the entirety of the claim or defense and equates
to one-hundred percent of its dollar value. 173 Therefore, even
under Cooter and Rubinfeld's own analysis, in order to deter-
mine whether a particular discovery request is "marginal" or
"impositional," compliance costs should be weighed against the
entire dollar value of related claims or defenses, and not simply
172. Easterbrook, supra note 130, at 641 (footnote omitted).
173. As Professor Cooper has pointed out to me, a judge or jury is likely to
render a larger award if 75% confident on the merits than if 51% (or 30%).
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a smaller dollar amount attributable to a small percentage in-
crease in the likelihood of prevailing on particular claims or de-
fenses.I7 4
Fifth, determination of a "switching point" beyond which
costs should be shifted would require retrospective factual de-
terminations by courts of both the anticipated value of re-
quested information and the reasonable expenses of complying
with discovery requests. Courts understandably would be ex-
tremely reluctant to undertake any such inquiries. Cooter and
Rubinfeld's cost-shifting proposal, assuming that it could be
implemented, would engulf courts in a morass of satellite liti-
gation much worse than the ex ante reasonableness inquiry,
imperfect and malleable though it is, that courts use today in
ruling on discovery motions.17 5
Sixth, in singling out discovery as economically inefficient,
Cooter and Rubinfeld focus on the wrong snapshot. To suggest
that discovery should be deemed acceptable or "abusive" de-
pending on whether or not it conforms to an economic construct
of cost internalization ignores the purposes of discovery as well
as the policies that inform the law concerning the "American
Rule" and fee-shifting generally. If there is economic ineffi-
ciency or loss from discovery costs, the problem is less that dis-
covery is not fully cost-internalizing than that various real-
world extra-litigation activities, which prompt or require litiga-
tion, are not. Society may require persons to purchase liability
insurance to internalize some of the costs of activities such as
negligent driving or manufacturing and selling harmful prod-
ucts, and may.adopt various liability rules that require tortfea-
sors or contract-breakers to internalize some of the costs of
their conduct. But these expedients are not fully cost-
internalizing, both for historical reasons and for policy reasons
that many find persuasive.
In the United States, under the so-called "American Rule,"
each party to litigation bears its own attorney's fees unless a
legislatively created or judicially recognized exception ap-
174. How their model would operate in cases in which what is at stake is
injunctive or declaratory, rather than monetary, relief, Cooter and Rubinfeld
conveniently do not bother to describe. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 470.
175. As Judge Easterbrook has put it, "How can a judge distinguish a dry
hole (common in litigation as well as in the oil business) from a request that
was not justified at the time?" Easterbrook, supra note 130, at 639; see also
Cooper, supra note 2, at 468.
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plies.176 The American Rule, which has been law since the
eighteenth century,177 has four traditional policy justifications:
first, that shifting fees would have a "penalizing" effect on los-
ing participants in litigation, which is, after all, inherently un-
certain; second, that awarding prevailing parties their attor-
ney's fees would tend to discourage litigants of small means
from "seeking to vindicate their rights in court"; third, that it
would overburden the judicial system to have to determine rea-
sonable attorney's fees in each case; and fourth, that lawyers
might subordinate client interests to avoid irritating judges
who later would be determining the lawyers' fees. 178 Any pro-
posal for shifting litigation expenses must ultimately confront
and come to terms with these policy concerns. Proposals such
as Cooter and Rubinfeld's, which fail to mention, much less
consider, them are clearly insufficient.
As superficially theoretically attractive as the Cooter-
Rubinfeld analysis and its accompanying proposal may seem at
first, they are based ultimately on misleading assumptions
about the conduct of discovery in practice and a sleight-of-hand
substitution of economic efficiency alone for a host of other val-
ues and policy concerns that need to inform the design of our
litigation process.
VI. THE FANTASY OF SELF-ENFORCEMENT
Another basic flaw in the theory and structure of civil dis-
covery under the Federal Rules also negates the drafters' ex-
pectation that discovery would be self-enforcing in all but truly
exceptional cases. As law and economics scholars have shown,
rules are efficient when they provide penalties of a magnitude
that, in light of the probability of enforcement, suffice to pro-
duce the desired behavior. 179 Rules should provide effective in-
centives for observance and disincentives for violation. In this
sense, the discovery rules are woefully inefficient in a signifi-
cant percentage of cases. The incentive structure they create
176. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 247-71 (1975).
177. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
178. Joseph J. Ward, Corporate Goliaths in the Costume of David: The
Question of Association Aggregation Under the Equal Access to Justice Act-
Should the Whole Be Greater Than Its Parts?, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 151, 156
n.24 (1998).
179. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 75-86 (2d ed. 1989).
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becomes increasingly inadequate as the stakes in a lawsuit
rise, which is one of the main reasons why discovery disputes
requiring judicial intervention are distressingly common in
complex or high-stakes cases.
Despite the drafters' hopes and expectations, the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have not
proved self-enforcing. They provide two enforcement proce-
dures: the motion to compel discovery, which can be invoked by
a discovery proponent to secure compliance with the respon-
dent's discovery obligations, 180 and the motion for protective or-
der, which can be invoked by a respondent to curtail over-
reaching discovery.'8 ' Either or both can be used to litigate
discovery disputes, although since 1970, the obligation to seek
judicial resolution belongs primarily to the party who desires to
have discovery requests enforced. 8 2 Since motions to compel
and motions for protective orders inevitably require fact-
scrutinizing judicial interventions typically after full briefing,
the procedures are time-consuming and generate much fact-
intensive, satellite litigation.
If a party's automatic disclosure or response to an inter-
rogatory, document request or deposition question is incom-
plete, evasive or denied, if the response is obfuscated by objec-
tions or assertions of privilege of doubtful validity, or if a
discovery request is disputed as to content, breadth or scope,
the parties can resort to a motion to compel discovery 83 or mo-
tion for a protective order.184 This involves, first, a meeting be-
tween the attorneys to try in good faith to reach agreement
concerning the desired discovery without judicial interven-
tion.18 5 Assuming that no agreement is reached, 8 6 the moving
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
182. See FED. R. CIv. P., advisory committee's explanatory statement con-
cerning 1970 amendments to discovery rules, pt. V ("The party seeking discov-
ery, rather than the objecting party, is made responsible for invoking judicial
determination of discovery disputes not resolved by the parties.").
183. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
184. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
185. Both Rule 26(c) and Rule 37(a) impose "meet and confer" obligations.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c), 37(a).
186. Ronald Olson, a prominent member of the California bar, has stated
that "the rules requiring attorneys to confer, or to certify that a good faith ef-
fort to do so was made ... are totally mechanistic and a waste of time. They
create just one more hurdle and one more costly step before reaching the heart
of the problem." The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 131, at 141; see also
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 32 (finding that the ma-
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party must bring its motion to compel or motion for protective
order with full briefing. If the proponent of the request prevails
on a motion to compel, typically she will obtain an order di-
recting the respondent to answer more fully. Conversely, if the
discovery respondent prevails on a motion for protective order,
typically she will obtain an order limiting or curtailing the dis-
covery or imposing terms and conditions by which it may be
had. In either case, the court is directed to award sanctions in
favor of the party prevailing on the motion, which almost al-
ways consist of the prevailing party's expenses of litigating the
motion, including the party's reasonable attorney's fees, unless
the loser's opposition was substantially justified or the circum-
stances render an award of expenses unjust. 8 7
This procedure is problematic for several reasons. First
and foremost, the incentive structure inherent in the Federal
Rules fails to provide sufficient incentives to cooperate, except
in low-stakes cases where the amount at issue does not justify
the costs of litigating a discovery motion with its risk of sanc-
tions.188 The risk of having to pay one's adversary's attorney's
fees incurred in litigating a motion to compel discovery or mo-
tion for protective order in addition to one's own fees, however,
pales into insignificance as the stakes' 89 in the litigation in-
crease.
To take a simplified example, assume that it costs from
$7,500 to $15,000 for each side to brief and argue an average
discovery motion. The risk of having to pay from $15,000 to
$30,000 (one's own and one's adversary's expenses) if one were
jority of 60% of lawyers "who had met and conferred did not think meeting and
conferring had any effect on litigation expenses, disposition time," or number
of issues in case).
187. Conversations with friends in practice suggest that some judges rarely
award monetary sanctions, despite the apparent intention of the initially
mandatory language of Rule 37, leaving the risk of incurring judicial displeas-
ure as the only practical limit on adversarial behavior in discovery disputes.
See infra pp. 554-55.
188. This explains the findings of the Federal Judicial Center Report and
the RAND Report that discovery works well in the majority of "routine" cases.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 21; RAND REPORT, su-
pra note 6, at 74.
189. The "stakes" can vary tremendously, from simply the maximum possi-
ble monetary recovery or loss in the specific case, to possible considerations or
consequences extending far beyond the case, including the value of the infor-
mation sought to be produced or protected, the stare decisis value of the result
of the lawsuit, the value of future litigations based on similar claims, etc.,
which sometimes can far exceed the amount at issue in the immediate case.
See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 71-72.
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to lose the motion would be a significant disincentive to taking
an unjustified or unreasonable position in a paradigmatic "or-
dinary" case in which the maximum at stake is $100,000 and
the total litigation budget for each side is in the neighborhood
of $35,000. On the other hand, where the stakes approach or
exceed half-a-million dollars, the risk of having to pay from
$15,000 to $30,000 if one loses a motion to compel or motion for
protective order is much less important and undoubtedly worth
bearing in order to obtain or preserve strategic informational
advantage. Where the stakes are even greater, any deterrent
effect of this sanction becomes negligible.
In high-stakes cases, therefore, the quantum of sanctions
that the rules prescribe for losers of discovery motions is
grossly inadequate. The incentive structure envisaged by the
Federal Rules is ill-designed to deter overreaching discovery by
proponents and incomplete, evasive and dilatory responses to
discovery by respondents. Most of all, it is insufficient to deter
disputing parties from avoiding impasse and seeking judicial
resolution of their disputes.
Whenever the stakes involved in litigation are great
enough for a party to risk incurring all or part of the expenses
of a discovery motion-including paying the opponent's attor-
ney's fees if the court's ruling on the motion is adverse-there
is little to lose and potentially much to gain from dilatory, eva-
sive or obstructive behavior by discovery respondents or from
overreaching discovery by discovery proponents.
Empirical evidence confirms this analysis. The Federal
Judicial Center's study reports:
Discovery problems were... much more likely to be reported in cases
with higher stakes. As the stakes increased from $4,000 or less (27%
of these attorneys saying there were problems) to over $2 million
(69%), the percentage reporting problems increased progressively....
Attorneys in cases valued over $150,000 (28% of these attorneys) were
more than twice as likely to report multiple types of problems with
discovery than attorneys in lower-stakes cases (12%).... Where a lot
of money is at stake, where the issues involve personal injury or mat-
ters of principle, where the relationships are contentious and the is-
sues complex, here we see more discovery and more problems with
discovery.1
190. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 21. This analy-
sis accords with David M. Trubek's finding that stakes cap the amount of law-
yer time invested. See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litiga-
tion, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 95-96 (1983).
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In addition to the incentive problem, the procedure for liti-
gating discovery disputes is extremely cumbersome. It requires
the parties to generate stacks of briefs with weighty supporting
affidavits. It also requires judges who typically are ill-
acquainted with the out-of-court conduct of the litigation to
make extremely fact-intensive determinations of relevance, en-
titlement and fault. Since notice pleading permits claims to be
alleged in a vague and general manner, deciding questions of
relevance and entitlement, scope and burden is a difficult,
daunting and time-consuming task that devours a dispropor-
tionate amount of judicial resources.
Experienced litigators know that it is easy to comply tech-
nically with the letter of the discovery rules while significantly
departing from their spirit. To take but one common example,
many lawyers routinely interpose boilerplate objections' 91 to
both interrogatories and document requests and then offer an-
swers or state that they will produce documents subject to the
stated objections. 192
The purported rationale for this practice is to protect
against the possibility that an answer or production will later
be deemed insufficient or incomplete. Nonetheless, it also has
two problematic effects, both of them intended: first, evading
the requirement of Rule 26(g) that a lawyer's signature on a
discovery response constitutes a certificate that to the best of
the signer's knowledge formed after reasonable inquiry, the re-
sponse is complete as of the time it is made, 193 and second,
keeping the discovery proponent from knowing whether the an-
swer or production is thought or intended by the respondent to
be complete.
Although objectionable deposition questions, apart from
those that trench on recognized evidentiary privileges, are sup-
191. Among the common ones are that the interrogatory or document re-
quest is: (1) vague; (2) not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence; (3) overly broad in scope; or (4) unreasonably burdensome
to respond to. See, e.g., Trustmark Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago
Hosp., No. 94-04692, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1614, at *24-25 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14,
1996) (including objections stating that document request was "overly broad,
unduly burdensome, oppressive, designed to annoy and/or harass, and... not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" merely
tracked language of Rule 26(b)(2) and did not give any factually-based expla-
nation for conclusion that request was improper).
192. See, e.g., Wallace v. General Elec. Co., No. 87-1236, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10711, at *7-9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1988) (stating that defendant an-
swered plaintiffs interrogatories subject to objections).
193. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
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posed to be answered subject to objections, 194 answering an in-
terrogatory or stating that one will produce documents subject
to stated objections is manifestly improper. Some courts ac-
knowledge as much,195 but others do not seem to appreciate the
purpose and effects of the practice.196
In any case, despite their theoretical availability, serious
sanctions for violations of the discovery rules are awarded
rarely under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 37(b), sanctions are to be awarded when a party
fails to comply with a discovery order, which obviously requires
that such an order be in place. 197 Under Rule 37(d), however,
sanctions are only available when a party has ignored a discov-
ery request totally.
This means that in practice, parties and their lawyers can
initially evade, obfuscate and respond incompletely to discovery
virtually with impunity, so long as they do not ignore a discov-
ery request or totally fail to respond. 98 Not until the proponent
194. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c).
195. See Badalamenti v. Dunham's Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that a party served with a document request has the options of
(1) responding by agreeing to produce documents as requested; (2) responding
by objecting; (3) moving for protective order; and (4) ignoring the request; only
ignoring the request or totally failing to respond justifies imposition of Rule
37(d) sanctions). The court in Fisons stated:
It appears clear that no conceivable discovery request could have
been made by the doctor that would have uncovered the relevant
documents, given the above and other responses of the drug company.
The objections did not specify that certain documents were not being
produced. Instead the general objections were followed by a promise
to produce requested documents. These responses did not comply
with either the spirit or letter of the discovery rules and thus were
signed in violation of the certification requirement.
Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d
1054, 1083 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
196. See, e.g., American Health Sys., Inc. v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n, No. 93-
0542, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15447, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1994) (holding
that where defendants represented repeatedly that they would produce re-
quested documentation subject to their initial objections, plaintiff has obliga-
tion to facilitate defendants' promised production prior to filing motion to
compel).
197. But see Fisons, 858 P.2d at 345 (holding that a motion to compel com-
pliance is not a prerequisite to a sanctions motion).
198. See, e.g., Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Discovery: The Utility of
RFAs, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 18, 1999, at B16, B16 ("Putting aside systematic and
outrageous discovery abuse for which ultimate sanctions can be imposed, the
typical remedy for typical evasiveness is usually no more severe than an order
to do what you should have done in the first place, probably coupled with a
manageable monetary sanction.").
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has obtained from the trial court an order compelling discovery
will the respondent run any serious risk by obstructing, evad-
ing or responding incompletely. 99 Should the respondent still
not comply, despite the proponent having obtained a court or-
der, the proponent can return to the court and by further mo-
tion practice persuade the judge of the respondent's intransi-
gence. Only at this stage may judicial displeasure result in
serious repercussions. As befits penalties for defiance of court
orders, these will be significantly more dire than the legal ex-
pense sanctions involved in the original Rule 37 motion and
may include various kinds of preclusion sanctions.2°0
Defects in the incentive structure in the discovery rules
have not gone completely unnoticed by jurists, although few
solutions have been suggested. Judge Robert Keeton, for ex-
ample, a highly experienced trial lawyer, longtime law profes-
sor and one of the most insightful of sitting federal trial judges,
has recognized that "[tihe real incentive structure that rules
tend to create in current circumstances may be an incentive
structure not intended by drafters."20' Indeed, it would be diffi-
cult to argue with the proposition that the discovery rules pres-
ently create an incentive structure that fails abysmally to
achieve the cooperative ideal envisaged by the drafters, at least
in complex and high-stakes cases.
One can imagine various ways to alter the incentive struc-
ture of the discovery rules, including: (a) immediately imposing
199. Evasion is not completely without risk, since courts have discretion
under Rule 37 to exclude evidence not produced in discovery without a prior
motion to compel. See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Discovery: Fight
the Compulsion to Compel, NATL L.J., June 7, 1999, at B22, B22.
200. The "preclusion sanctions" provided by Rule 37(b)(2) include:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established
for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the
party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from
introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
201. KEETON, supra note 15, at 182.
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the preclusion sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2) upon parties that liti-
gate discovery motions and lose, rather than first requiring
violation of an order compelling discovery or a protective order;
(b) adopting a procedure better designed to promote cooperative
behavior among attorneys in discovery consistent with the
spirit and purpose of the Rules, such as that proposed by Judge
Keeton, essentially a form of "final offer arbitration" in which
the judge informs the parties that he will spend only as much
time investigating a discovery dispute as is necessary to iden-
tify the party espousing the less reasonable position, and then
will rule against that party in toto;20 2 (c) awarding a quantum
of sanctions against litigants who lose decisions on discovery
motions that more closely corresponds to the stakes in the law-
suit than simply the expenses of litigating the motion; and (d)
eliminating the possibility of adjudication of discovery disputes
by judges and magistrate judges altogether, leaving lawyers
who engage in such disputes and the parties they represent to
suffer the consequences of taking unreasonable positions.20 3
None of these proposals is without problems, however, and the
last is seriously deficient.
A. IMMEDIATELY IMPOSING PRECLUSION SANCTIONS UPON
LOSERS OF DISCOVERY MOTIONS
Imposing preclusion sanctions immediately, the argument
runs, would change attorneys' behavior in short order. Rather
than risk preclusion of evidence, striking of a claim or defense
or establishment of a disputed fact as stipulated by a court or-
der or jury instruction, attorneys would alter their behavior to
curtail excessive discovery demands on one hand and avoid
evasive or dilatory responses on the other. Attorneys would be
especially likely to change their behavior if preclusion could
give rise to a legal malpractice action by the client.
Although the Supreme Court has approved dismissal of
claims in circumstances of persistent dilatory conduct by coun-
sel,20 4 courts typically are reluctant to award preclusion sanc-
tions, holding them excessively harsh unless provoked by a
willful violation of an order compelling discovery.205 Use of pre-
202. See id. at 184-87.
203. I owe this suggestion to Professors Jeffrey S. Parker and Larry E. Rib-
stein of George Mason University School of Law. See infra pp. 560-61.
204. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 & n.10 (1962).
205. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd on other grounds, 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
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clusion sanctions as a prophylactic for discovery disputes in
civil litigation would resemble imposing the death penalty as a
means of preventing recidivism for petty crimes.
Judicial reluctance to impose preclusion sanctions is well-
founded. In addition to due process concerns and the fear of
depriving litigants of their day in court, in many discovery dis-
putes which side should prevail is a close question and ample
justifications exist for the positions of both.206 Also, if a party
makes reasonable efforts to comply with its discovery obliga-
tions but cannot do so because of facts beyond the party's con-
trol, applying a preclusion sanction, such as dismissal of the
complaint, arguably would constitute deprivation of a property
interest without due process of law.20 7
Given society's expressed preference for having disputes
decided on their merits208 rather than technicalities, preclusion
sanctions would be too draconian to employ routinely, and we
should not expect to see them utilized as a matter of course any
time soon.209
B. CHANGING THE OPERATIVE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE To
PROMOTE COOPERATION
Observing correctly that an award of attorney's fees after a
ruling on a discovery motion often does not provide a sufficient
disincentive for lawyers to take unreasonable positions in dis-
covery, Judge Keeton routinely has utilized a procedure crafted
to produce better incentives for counsel to cooperate:
206. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726
F.2d 1150, 1162, 1172-73 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (showing disagreement be-
tween majority and minority whether plaintiffs' discovery of defendant's
membership records was "predatory" or necessary to establish claims), rev'd on
other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Another example was the discovery re-
ported by the press to have been requested by each party in Jones v. Clinton
concerning the sexual history, practices and attitudes of the adversary. See
Neil A. Lewis, Jones's Lawyers Ask President For Details About His Sex Life,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at A16. Although discovery into such private mat-
ters obviously had potential for embarrassment, humiliation and coercion to
settle, it also was the kind of information arguably needed by each party to
prove its respective claims or defenses.
207. See Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979).
208. See Baker, 86 F.3d at 817 (holding that the sanction for failure to
comply with a discovery order is too harsh if it "failed to achieve a balance be-
tween the policies of preventing discovery delays and deciding cases on the
merits.").
209. See Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 483.
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It is the sanction of adopting as a judicial order the position of the at-
torney whose posture just before hearing is less unreasonable than
the opponent's. That is, the judge hears the controversy only long
enough to determine which side has been more unreasonable up to
the point that the hearing commenced, and adopts the other side's po-
sition as the court's order resolving the discovery dispute.
210
This is, in effect, a form of "final offer arbitration," such as
that regularly employed in professional baseball salary dis-
putes.21' The arbitrator has no discretion to fashion his own
result; all he can do is to choose one or the other of the contest-
ants' final offers. In theory, this procedure has several advan-
tages. First, since the judge is unlikely to accept an unreason-
able position, it gives the parties an incentive to concede the
more extreme and adversarial aspects of their positions during
negotiation, in order to make their final offer more reasonable.
Thus, it is designed to utilize effectively the disciplining force of
uncertainty212 to restrain and mold lawyers' behavior into a co-
operative mode and encourage dispute settlement consistent
with the letter and spirit of the discovery rules. In addition, it
should reduce the time judicial officers need to spend combing
the fine details of discovery disputes in order to reach rulings.
The procedure is not without disadvantages, however. In
complex or high-stakes cases, especially where the parties each
may have good reasons for requesting and withholding dis-
puted information or materials, as for example highly prized
trade secrets in an intellectual property dispute, the procedure
probably will not suffice everywhere to produce the cooperative
behavior desired. To be effective, it still would require deter-
mined and constant judicial supervision, including timely rul-
ings when discovery disputes arise.213 Not least, where there
210. KEETON, supra note 15, at 184. Judge Keeton gives notice to lawyers
who appear before him both through an order regarding discovery (a form of
which is included in his book, see id. at 185-88) and, at status conferences, in
repeated descriptions of his procedure and admonitions to cooperate. See id.
211. See Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major
League Baseball, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 230 (1998); Amy Farmer & Paul Pe-
corino, Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis ofFinal-OfferArbitra-
tion, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 (1998).
212. See generally Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncer-
tainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54 (noting the beneficial effects of uncertainty in litiga-
tion).
213. Professor Cooper informs me that judges who promise prompt discov-
ery rulings say they have no difficulty delivering on the promise, since it is the
promise of prompt judicial attention, with its attendant risk of uncertainty,
that produced lawyer cooperation. This accords well with the experience of
Wilmington lawyers who observe that the Delaware Supreme Court's recent
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are good reasons for the positions taken on both sides, its appli-
cation would seem of doubtful propriety, since parties should
not be penalized214 for exercising their rights to assert non-
frivolous grounds for seeking or withholding discovery.
C. CHANGING THE QUANTUM OF SANCTIONS AWARDED ON
DISCOVERY MOTIONS
Another way to deter litigants from taking confrontational
positions in discovery would be to change the quantum of sanc-
tions awarded to the prevailing party on adjudications of dis-
covery motions from the expenses incurred in litigating the mo-
tion (including reasonable attorney's fees) to some amount
bearing a closer correspondence to the stakes in the lawsuit.
Obviously directed to the problem of the inadequacy of the at-
torney's fee sanction in high-stakes cases, such a proposal
would face certain obvious problems at the outset. First, it
would be difficult if not impossible to apply in suits seeking in-
junctive or other non-monetary relief. Second, even if the Rules
Enabling Act would permit use of such sanctions without ex-
press congressional approval,2 15 their interaction with attor-
ney's fee-shifting statutes designed to encourage plaintiffs to
bring meritorious lawsuits would create a host of new policy
complications without clear solutions. Third, as with Judge
Keeton's proposal, requiring the loser to pay a large sanction
when it asserted a good-faith or non-frivolous position that did
not carry the day seems unduly punitive. Fourth, increasing
the sanctions for losing discovery motions risks further dis-
placement of the emphasis of the litigation process from adjudi-
cation of the merits to pretrial procedural wrangles.
declaration that in case of disputes at depositions, "the Delaware Courts are
just a phone call away" has had a salutary effect on the conduct of depositions.
See infra note 316.
214. It may be argued that being held to the position the judge deems more
reasonable can hardly be viewed as a penalty. However, in situations where
the parties have well-grounded arguments for seeking to discover and to pro-
tect documents or information, what seems marginally more reasonable to the
judge may seem manifestly unreasonable to the losing party, who has scant
opportunity to seek appellate review of the decision without incurring con-
tempt sanctions, since rulings on discovery motions are unreviewable inter-
locutory orders.
215. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-
71 (1975) (holding that new fee-shifting exceptions to the American Rule re-
quire Congressional approval); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
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D. REMOVING THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Advocates of market-based solutions suggest that simply
abolishing the possibility of adjudicating discovery disputes
might lessen the incidence of such disputes. The argument
reasons that to get information, one must be willing to give in-
formation, and, like the framers of the discovery rules, assumes
that self-interest would produce on both sides a willingness to
cooperate. If adjudication of discovery disputes were abolished,
parties obviously would save the expense of briefing discovery
motions. Without recourse to adjudication of discovery dis-
putes, parties and their lawyers would be less likely to take ex-
treme positions leading to confrontation and impasse. Further,
it is argued, attorneys as officers of the court would of necessity
take greater responsibility for cooperative discovery, and con-
cern for their professional reputations would deter lawyers
from cheating.
One may be forgiven for regarding this proposal skepti-
cally.216 First, many lawsuits are not amenable to anything
approaching an equal exchange of information, since one party
has more information than the other, while the party with the
burden of persuasion at trial has special need for information.
Often, of course, these conditions combine to produce the fa-
miliar scenario in which the plaintiff needs information while
the defendant has it, so that any incentives to share are en-
tirely asymmetrical.
Second, the history and professional norms of the Ameri-
can adversarial system are so skewed toward promoting clients'
advantage and protecting clients' interests that, regardless of
the theory's predictions, it would take a cultural sea change for
lawyers to cooperate freely in discovery in high-stakes and
complex cases without an enforcement mechanism. In the
short run, removing the possibility of enforcement through ad-
judication by judicial officers would most likely result in more,
rather than less, cheating, evasion and obstruction. In the long
216. It resembles unpersuasive arguments by some law and economics
scholars that issuers of securities in the capital markets have sufficient incen-
tives to disclose information at a socially optimal level without being com-
pelled to do so by the requirements of the federal securities laws and regula-
tions promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that
therefore we should abolish the Securities and Exchange Commission along
with the federal securities statutes and their system of mandatory disclosure.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909,
921-49 (1994).
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run, it would turn the clock back to before 1938, when dispari-
ties of wealth and power among the parties often resulted in in-
surmountable informational asymmetries and trial by surprise.
Additionally, most discovery in complex and high-stakes
cases is conducted by relatively new associates at large law
firms. Most of these lawyers do not have serious expectations
of becoming partners and therefore are not particularly con-
cerned with maintaining their firms' long-term reputations for
fairness or playing by the discovery rules. Indeed, to the extent
that these associates care about reputation at all, they are
more likely to be concerned with building their own reputations
within the firm for toughness, aggressiveness and thorough-
ness on the client's behalf than with the firm's ethical reputa-
tion in the local legal community.217
Self-enforcement of the discovery rules is accordingly much
easier said than done in cases in which the stakes are high. Al-
though lawyers tend to agree in principle that cooperation and
reciprocity is a good idea, when it comes to their own cases ad-
versariness guides behavior designed to capture and maximize
informational advantage. The available enforcement mecha-
nism, adjudication of discovery motions, provides sanctions
against adversarial excess that are ineffective, insufficient and
in any case come far too late.
VII. THE MIRAGE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
According to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, "[tihe
belief [is] almost universal [among members of the academic
community, the bench and the bar] that the cost of discovery
disputes could be reduced by greater judicial involvement and
that the earlier in the process that judges became involved, the
better."218 According to the Federal Judicial Center Report
published in 1997, when asked how to alleviate discovery
problems, lawyers most often recommend increased judicial
case management.219 Similarly, the RAND Report observed
that cases high in complexity, discovery difficulty or stakes
217. Cf Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery
Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1639 (1996) ("Younger lawyers, convinced
that their future careers may hinge on how tough they seem while conducting
discovery, may conclude that it is more important to look and sound ferocious
than to act cooperatively, even if all that huffing and puffing does not help
(and sometimes harms) their cases.").
218. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 21, at 3.
219. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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"cappear to especially benefit from the use of discovery/case
management plans."220 To students of procedure, these conclu-
sions evoke nothing as much as a vivid feeling of d6j& vu, for
they closely track similar recommendations of myriad lawyers
and judges for at least the last forty years, a period during
which there have been remarkably consistent calls for in-
creased judicial control.
In 1957, Judge Albert Ridge, discussing the organization of
large cases, warned how easy it was to lose control of a case
with many fringe issues if the court did not "exercise rigid con-
trol from the time the complaint [was] filed."22' Other lawyers'
and judges' views echoed those of Judge Ridge. Then-Professor
Jack Weinstein observed that greater judicial control over the
discovery process was desirable, even as he doubted the suffi-
ciency of judicial manpower to exercise that degree of control in
the Southern District of New York.222 Another lawyer stated:
The control of discovery cannot wait until it proves to be burden-
some or oppressive. If the courts want to keep a big case within
bounds, they must control it from the start. Otherwise the case gets
off on the wrong foot and it becomes more and more difficult to keep it
from becoming a judicial nightmare. 3
As another put it, "[i]f [discovery procedures] are permitted to
operate without adequate restraint they can become more of a
burden than they are worth."224
Explaining the need for greater judicial management in
1958, Judge Joe E. Estes noted:
If the judge fails to forcibly curb counsel who violate the letter and
spirit of the rules of discovery, the entire process will break down. As
every trial lawyer knows, the great abuse of discovery occurs in the
court whose judge is unwilling to enforce the powerful sanctions
available. There are few lawyers who fail to heed the considered sug-
gestion of a firm judge.m
Judge Irving R. Kaufman voiced similar sentiments: "[Tihe
type of broad search for truth contemplated by the discovery
220. RAND REPORT, supra note 6, at xxii.
221. Albert A. Ridge, The Organization of the Big Case-The First Pretrial
Conference, 21 F.R.D. 396, 408 (1957).
222. See Jack B. Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise Discovery, 23
F.R.D. 36, 37 (1958) (recommending increased use of masters in view of insuf-
ficiency of judicial manpower).
223. James R. Withrow, Jr., Defense Counsel's View of a Government Civil
Antitrust Suit, 21 F.R.D. 427, 438 (1957).
224. Manley B. Strayer, Discovery in Pretrial Conference Procedure, 23
F.R.D. 347, 350 (1958).
225. Estes, supra note 54, at 297.
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procedures... can be effective only if the judiciary is available
at all stages to enforce the spirit of the rules."226
In 1968, the author of a major study of discovery published
by the Russell Sage Foundation concluded that "effective judi-
cial administration is necessary to implement the goals and let-
ter of the rules."2 27 In 1979, an experienced lawyer reflecting
on the discovery rules again called for more court-directed su-
pervision and management of cases if the rules were to achieve
their goals. 228 The same year, the Supreme Court observed
that district judges had "ample powers" to prevent abuse of the
discovery process.229
Once more in 1980, the authors of a Federal Judicial Cen-
ter study agreed with views of the attorneys they interviewed
and concluded that "the best short-term solution to ... discov-
ery problems.., lies in judicial control."230 In 1981, Professor
Maurice Rosenberg observed that "the current trend of think-
ing is that greater judicial involvement, not less, is essential to
reduce problems of discovery abuse."231
A year later, at the National Conference on Discovery Re-
form held in Austin, Judge William W. Schwarzer urged,
"[olbviously this is not a self-executing process that can be left
to the lawyers. It requires the active involvement of the judge
from the earliest stages of the lawsuit.2 32 Judge Alvin Rubin
agreed: "Judges should get involved early. They should get in-
volved because that is the best way for the lawyers to cooperate
and the best way for judges to know the case and resolve prob-
lems. Judicial involvement is the best way to manage cases."233
These repeated calls for increased judicial involvement
came to a fruition of sorts with the 1983 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which extensively revised
Rules 7, 11, 16 and 26 with the explicit purpose of facilitating
226. Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision
Over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 213 (1958).
227. GLASER, supra note 20, at 243.
228. See Cutner, supra note 20, at 954.
229. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979).
230. EBERSOLE & BURKE, supra note 68, at 79; see also id. at 64, 73, 76.
231. Rosenberg & King, supra note 50, at 589.
232. William W. Schwarzer, Discovery in the Scheme of Things-Rethink-
ing the Litigation Process, quoted in The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note
131, at 123.
233. The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 131, at 205 (quoting Judge
Rubin) (emphasis in original).
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early judicial involvement in and supervision of cases.234 As
the Advisory Committee stated in the Official Comments to the
Amendments,
Without judicial guidance beginning shortly after institution, [com-
plex or protracted] cases often become mired in discovery.
... Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes per-
sonally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to
schedule dates for completion by the parties of the principal pretrial
steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently
and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their
own devices.n
[Rule 26(b)] contemplates greater judicial involvement in the dis-
covery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot al-
ways operate on a self-regulating basis.2
6
Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition
that there is a need for more aggressive judicial control and supervi-
sion.27
Despite the official adoption of increased judicial manage-
ment through early intervention and ongoing supervision as a
guiding principle, a mere two years elapsed before a law review
article noted once more that although judicial intervention was
necessary to curb discovery problems, many judges were reluc-
tant to undertake it and left discovery disputes unresolved for
inordinately long periods of time.238 In 1989, a Brookings Insti-
tution Report once again concluded that in order to reduce cost
and delay associated with civil litigation, judges should take a
more active role in case management.239 In 1995, well-known
234. See Margaret L. Weissbrod, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26-
Scalpel or Meat-ax? The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 187-90 (1985).
235. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
238. See Cavanagh, supra note 33, at 776, 778.
239. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REPORT, supra note 60, at 3, 12-14. The re-
port stated:
The excessive cost and delay associated with litigating civil cases
in America should no longer be tolerated and can be forcefully ad-
dressed through procedural reform, more active case management by
judges, and better efforts by attorneys and their clients to control cost
and delay.
In particular, we conclude:
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Chicago attorney Philip Corboy stated, "Judicial management
is the only way we are going to get sanity back into the pretrial
procedures."240 In 1996, Professor Yablon called for judicial in-
volvement yet again, when in a flippant article he called for
judges simply to tell lawyers engaging in abusive discovery
practices "to shut up and knock it off."24' Similarly, in Septem-
ber 1997, Professor Thomas Rowe, summarizing proceedings of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's conference at Boston
College Law School, noted that several lawyers repeated re-
quests for judges to be available to provide "'adult supervision'
of bickering lawyers."242 The conclusions of the Advisory Com-
mittee and of the RAND and Federal Judicial Center reports
are thus only among the most recent exemplars of an unbroken
tradition of calling for greater judicial involvement and super-
vision that stretches back forty years at least.
If calls for increased judicial management of the discovery
process have been so remarkably consistent, why have they not
been more consistently heeded by judges? There appear to be
three main reasons. The first is limited judicial resources, in
terms of both the number of judicial officers and competing de-
mands on their time. Judge Irving Kaufman wrote in 1957,
even as he advocated close day-to-day supervision of the discov-
ery process, that he supposed judges would have sufficient time
to provide the required supervision themselves "[wihen the
millen[n]ium comes," and that until then he believed the use of
special masters to supervise discovery worthy of considera-
tion.243 Despite the addition of more judges and magistrates,
-That judges should take a more active role in managing their
cases, ending the practice in some courts of delegating to magistrates
functions that are in fact better performed by judges.
Id. at 3.
240. Gilbert Jimenez, Justices Order Pre-Trial Speedup, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
June 2, 1995, at 20, available in 1995 WL 6656185.
241. Yablon, supra note 217, at 1620.
242. E-mail from Professor Thomas Rowe to Law Faculty Discussion List of
Civil Procedure (Sept. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
243. Irving R. Kaufinan, Report on Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D.
55, 64 (1957). For the use of masters generally, see GLASER, supra note 20, at
240-41; Weinstein, supra note 222, at 37. At the 1982 National Conference on
Discovery Reform, diverse opinions were expressed concerning usefulness of
magistrates in supervising the discovery process. See The Judge's Role in Dis-
covery, supra note 131, at 100-01. A 1987 Louis Harris opinion survey of 800
state judges and 200 federal judges concluded that the judges polled thought
shortage of judges to be the second most important cause of litigation delay
generally. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., JUDGES' OPINIONS ON PROCEDURAL
ISSUES: A SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES WHO SPEND AT
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increasing caseload pressure "makes understandable judges'
decisions to assign a relatively low priority to discovery squab-
bles," as Flegal and Umin observed in 1981.244
In the last two decades, however, docket pressure has in-
creased, not abated.245 As of this writing, on the eve of the
millennium, Judge Kaufman's hopeful prediction that judges
would have enough time for more personal supervision of dis-
covery has not been fulfilled. Moreover, the increasingly parti-
san approach to the judicial confirmation process taken by both
political parties in the Senate, particularly since the Bork and
Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings, has exacer-
bated the judicial personnel problem, leaving many authorized
judgeships vacant for inordinate periods.246
In any event, district judges generally spend only about
five percent of case-related time on discovery matters, includ-
ing scheduling, management, and considering and deciding mo-
tions to compel and motions for protective orders, according to a
recent Federal Judicial Center time study of federal district
LEAST HALF OF THEIR TIME ON GENERAL CIVIL CASES 33-34 (1987).
244. Frank F. Flegal & Steven M. Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil
Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 BYU L. REV. 597, 603-04.
245. Published reports of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts make clear that despite additions of authorized judgeships in 1979,
1988 and again in 1996, caseloads have increased overall. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD:
A FIVE-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (1997), available in The Federal Judiciary
Homepage (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/publications.
html>; see also the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. In his 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted that 1997 saw courts of appeals and bankruptcy fil-
ings at their highest rates in history, with both a small increase in civil filings
and the largest federal criminal caseload in 60 years in district courts. He
stated further, "unless steps are taken to stop or reverse this trend, either the
demands placed on the federal Judiciary will eventually outstrip its resources,
or the Judiciary will become so large that it will lose its traditional character
as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction." WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, THE 1997 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, avail-
able in The Federal Judiciary Center Homepage (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
<http'J/www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>.
246. In his 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that 82 of the 846 Article III judicial offices in the federal ju-
diciary were vacant and that 26 of those judgeships had been vacant for 18
months or more and constituted "judicial emergencies." REHNQUIST, supra
note 245; see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD: A FIVE-YEAR RETROSPEC-
TIVE, supra note 245, at 12 ("On July 1, 1997, in the U.S. district courts, 73
vacancies existed among the 647 district judgeship positions authorized.
Twenty of the vacancies had existed for at least 18 months.").
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courts. 247 Judges explain that spending increased amounts of
time supervising discovery would divert judicial attention from
other important tasks, such as conducting trials,248 and un-
fairly favor cases in which counsel misbehave.249
Supervising discovery and addressing discovery problems
promptly would have obvious opportunity costs for docket man-
agement. Less time would be available for conducting trials in
other cases, 250 ruling on motions, working to settle cases and
holding status conferences. Absent clear demonstration that
judicial time is better spent addressing discovery problems
than discharging other responsibilities in other cases, judges
are not likely to change their behavior and devote significantly
more time to the discovery process than they do already.
The second reason for insufficient judicial involvement in
discovery disputes is that ruling on discovery motions requires
247. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 4, at 799 (quoting John E.
Shapard, Oral Presentation at the Federal Judicial Center Research Confer-
ence on Civil Discovery (Sept. 1991)).
248. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (11th
Cir. 1997) ("[S]carce judicial resources must be diverted from other cases to
resolve discovery disputes."); Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pre-
trial Development of Civil Actions, supra note 50, at 887.
249. As Judge Keeton said in a discussion at the National Conference on
Discovery Reform in 1982:
I would like to know if we are talking about a budget or litigating
on a budget. The court has to budget the court's limited time and the
simple exercise of that discretion, which is what is required in dealing
with proportionality, will take court time. Thus, attention will be di-
verted from other issues for which the court's time might be budgeted.
It is being proposed to give more of the limited judicial time to this
small percentage of our total case load in which discovery abuse has
occurred and to take it away from other cases. How can that be justi-
fied? As a judge, must I not consider whether the other cases deserve
that time more than this body of cases? If so, the sanction rule wil
not amount to much because the judge is likely to conclude that he
cannot properly give the attention required in order to make consid-
ered judgments about sanctions because the discovery cases do not
deserve the judge's budgeted time as soon as the other cases pending.
The Judge's Role in Discovery, supra note 131, at 181 (emphasis in original).
250. The enactment of the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161-3174 (1994), which required that arraignments be held within 10 days
of indictment and that criminal trials be held within 60 days of arraignment,
causing them to jump to the head of the queue on every district judge's docket,
resulted in less judicial attention being available for civil dockets. The advent
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 (title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984), 18 U.S.C. §§
3551-3559 (1994), had a similar effect on civil dockets, since mandatory mini-
mum sentences made plea bargains less attractive to accused persons, more of
whom chose to take their chances at trial.
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courts to engage in much specific fact-finding, often in the ab-
sence of sufficient familiarity with the facts. As then-Professor
Brazil observed, judges were concerned that there was too
much to know in big cases to make well-considered decisions
about many discovery matters.251 Moreover, without the as-
surance of thorough knowledge of the matters in dispute, courts
could not be confident that their discovery decisions would
maximize disclosure of all relevant evidence and impose no un-
fair burden on litigants.252
The third reason for insufficient judicial involvement is
simply that courts dislike having to deal with discovery dis-
putes, not unfairly viewing them as arising primarily from im-
moderate behavior of unreasonable lawyers.353 Many judges
have no intent to manage discovery, according to Brazil, who
reported that one judicial proponent of aggressive case man-
agement stated "that he finds most discovery disputes 'puerile'
affairs whose consumption of judicial resources he resents."254
A 1987 survey of a thousand state and federal trial judges by
Louis Harris and Associates revealed that the overwhelming
majority reported having problems with the discovery process
and that a sizeable majority blamed lawyers who used discov-
ery to turn over every stone and lawyers who used discovery to
intimidate or raise the stakes for their opponents. 255
A related reason why judges dislike discovery disputes is
that they often assume an obnoxiously vituperative and per-
sonal tone. As one court wrote recently, "'[If there is a hell to
which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be
one in which the damned are eternally locked in discovery dis-
251. See Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development
of Civil Actions, supra note 50, at 887; see also The Judge's Role in Discovery,
supra note 131, at 181 (quoting Judge Keeton); id. at 117 ("[It is presumptu-
ous for the judge to believe that on the basis of a ten minute or even one hour
presentation, he truly understands the parameters of the litigation." (quoting
Judge Gerard L. Goettel)).
252. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery, supra note 35,
at 1348-49.
253. See Diehl v. H.J. Heinz Co., 901 F.2d 73, 74 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring
to discovery dispute euphemistically as a "spitting match"); Trustmark Life
Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago Hosps., No. 94-C4692, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1614, at *25-26 (N.D. II. Feb. 14, 1996) (stating that discovery battles are
"distasteful and wasteful in general"); see also Shugrue, supra note 11, at 13.
254. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the Pretrial Development of
CivilActions, supra note 50, at 886-87.
255. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., supra note 243, at 38, 91-92.
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putes with other lawyers of equally repugnant attributes.' 256
Lawyers bickering over discovery often cast aspersions on each
other's veracity and credibility, sometih .es setting forth con-
flicting versions of purported agreements or negotiations
among counsel. To the extent that their affidavits do more
than simply authenticate other documents for judicial consid-
eration, they transform the lawyers into adverse witnesses,
providing an additional reason for judicial disgust with the pro-
cess. Judges regard such behavior not simply as unpleasant
but also as unprofessional, since it violates the traditional pro-
hibition against advocates simultaneously acting as wit-
nesses.
257
Persistent incentives to adversarial excess in discovery in
complex and high-stakes cases undoubtedly will continue to
produce discovery disputes. Given the reasons for judicial re-
luctance to devote significantly more time to management of
discovery or resolution of discovery problems, however, it is un-
realistic to expect major changes in judicial behavior, despite
the benefits that many argue would accrue from greater atten-
tion to the discovery process and its problems.
Viewing limitations on available judicial supervision sim-
ply in terms of opportunity costs, one might think that persis-
tent discovery wrangling might be eliminated by a significant
increase in the size of the federal judiciary. This is unlikely to
occur for a host of political and economic reasons, including, not
least significantly, the opposition of certain influential federal
judges themselves.258
256. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Krueger v. Pelican Prod. Corp., No-CIV-87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb.
24, 1989)).
257. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983); see
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1980).
258. Among the reasons commonly proffered in opposition to proposals to
increase the size of the federal judiciary are the asserted impossibility of
maintaining a judiciary of the highest quality; asserted excessive costs; the
supposed inconsistency of law that would result; and supposed reduction in
the collegiality of appellate courts. See Prepared Statement of Jon 0. New-
man, United States Circuit Judge, Before the Senate Committee on the Judici.
ary, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Federal News
Service, Sept. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File; Pre-
pared Statement of Gerald Bard Toflat, United States Circuit Judge, Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts,
Subcommittee on "Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate
Allocation of Judgeships in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit," Federal News Service, Feb. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Fednew File; Jon 0. Newman, Size of Federal Judiciary Threat to Qual-
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Another oft-proposed alternative would be the more regu-
lar appointment of judicial surrogates, such as special masters
to oversee discovery pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.259 Among the asserted advantages of such ap-
pointments are that masters could be more available than
judges on short notice 260 and could gain greater familiarity with
the conduct of discovery and circumstances of cases, that deci-
sions in instances of disputes could be delivered more promptly,
and that masters would be well situated to propose cost-
efficient and cooperative methods of sharing information.261
More regular appointment of masters to supervise discov-
ery would not be problem-free, however. One would have to
find a way to apportion fairly the expenses of the master's
services among the parties.262 In addition, informality of pro-
cedure without a record could encourage manipulative and op-
portunistic behavior by litigators. It also would remove adjudi-
ity, CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1991, at 3; see also GORDON BERMANT ET AL.,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 23-54 (1993);
Laura E. Little, The Future of the Federal Judiciary, 70 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151,
1151 (1997); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 273, 297-334 (1996).
259. There is an extensive literature on the possibility of using masters to
supervise discovery and other aspects of pretrial litigation. See Wayne D.
Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on
Existing Sources and the Need for a New Federal Rule, in MANAGING COMPLEX
LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 305
(Wayne D. Brazil et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Brazil, Authority to Refer Dis-
covery Tasks]; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
THIRD § 21.52, at 111-14 (1995); Frederick B. Lacey & Jay G. Safer, The
Authority, Roles, Responsibilities, and Utilization of Special Masters, in 2
BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 620, 620 (Robert
L. Haig ed. 1998); Wayne D. Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Mas-
ters: Is Rule 53 a Source ofAuthority and Restrictions?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. J.
143 [hereinafter Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters]; Wayne
D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Re-
shaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986) [hereinafter Brazil, Spe-
cial Masters in Complex Cases]; Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 53: An Enabling
Act Challenge, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1607, 1607-09 (1998); Irving R. Kaufman, Use
of Special Pre-Trial Masters in the "Big" Case, 23 F.R.D. 572 (1959); Wein-
stein, supra note 222.
260. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of
Big Cases: Potential and Problems, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra
note 259, at 1, 19 [hereinafter Brazil, Special Masters in Pretrial Develop-
ment].
261. See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases, supra note 259, at 411.
262. See Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks, supra note 259, at 22-
23; see also Cooper, supra note 259, at 1623.
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cation from public scrutiny, and could lead judicial surrogates
to "quick fixes" even as it insulated their actions from effective
judicial review.263
In any case, the appointment of masters to supervise dis-
covery appears to have been considered and rejected during the
formulation of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.26 Additionally, the Supreme Court has been wary of al-
lowing non-judicial officers to perform judicial functions, ex-
plicitly rejecting congested calendars, complex issues and
possible lengthy trials as conditions that would warrant refer-
ence to special masters.2 65 Several courts of appeals have
viewed judicial authority to utilize masters as strictly lim-
ited,266 and counsels' inability to resolve routine discovery dis-
putes has been rejected as sufficiently exceptional to warrant
appointment of a -special master to supervise discovery.267 Rou-
tine reference of discovery to special masters in the hope of re-
ducing or resolving discovery problems would thus require sat-
isfactorily addressing both the policy concerns and practical
difficulties involved in such referrals. It would also be neces-
sary to enact a new source of authority for referrals to mas-
ters.268 In most litigation reform proposals, however, routine
appointment of special masters does not command high prior-
ity.
VIII. SANCTIONS, WRIST SLAPS AND RAMBO
Courts have ample authority to impose sanctions, includ-
ing serious ones, on lawyers and litigants who fail to comply
with discovery obligations, unlawfully obstruct their adversar-
ies' access to proof, or suppress or destroy relevant information
or evidence.269 Although many courts address such matters
263. See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases, supra note 259, at 421-
22.
264. See Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks, supra note 259, at 306;
Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters, supra note 259, at 143-
85.
265. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1957).
266. See Liptak v. United States, 748 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 1984); see
also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg. Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 712 (7th
Cir. 1984); Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83 Civ. 8958 (PKL), 1986 WL 15669,
at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986).
267. See Weissman, 1986 WL 15669, at *22-23.
268. See Cooper, supra note 259, at 1608.
269. These include: (1) the powers granted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to impose "an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
2000]
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with sanctions appropriate to the gravity of the violation, 270
trial courts that exercise their sanctioning power authorita-
tively and with an eye to deterrent potency are often reversed
decisively on appeal.271 It is unusual for federal courts to refer
pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the viola-
tion[,]" FED R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3), in cases of violations of the signing/certification
duty of Rule 26(g), as well as the reasonable expenses sanctions of Rule 37(a),
(c) and (d), and the various preclusion sanctions of Rule 37(b)(2), see supra
note 200; (2) the power pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to require a person who
"multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.., to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct[,r" 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994); and (3) the in-
herent power of courts to sanction bad-faith conduct that abuses the judicial
process, see Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991). In addition,
courts have the inherent power to regulate the behavior of lawyers admitted to
their bars, as well as the power (and arguably the duty) to refer matters in ap-
propriate circumstances to disciplinary committees and prosecutors.
270. See Stars' Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d
521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that default judgment was an appropriate
sanction for defendant's repeated failure to submit to deposition); Melendez v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (deciding that it was
not an abuse of discretion to bar defendant's expert testimony as a sanction for
discovery violations); Phipps v. Blakeney, 8 F.3d 788, 790-96 (lth Cir. 1993)
(concluding that dismissal was an appropriate sanction for plaintiffs repeated
failure to attend discovery conferences or depositions); Chilcutt v. United
States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1325 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the district court's
sanction of deeming that plaintiff established the prima facie elements of the
liability claim was an appropriate sanction for discovery abuses); cf Washing-
ton State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1079-
85 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (directing the trial court to impose sanctions on de-
fense counsel for discovery abuse).
271. See Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(reversing discovery sanction precluding defendant from offering witnesses at
trial as abuse of discretion because the court did not consider whether the
sanction was necessary to further interests other than deterrence and if not,
whether less severe sanctions would have been more proportionate to the vio-
lation); Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1996)
(reversing dismissal of action as sanction but affirming imposition of monetary
sanctions); Wouters v. Martin County, 9 F.3d 924, 934 (11th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing dismissal an inappropriate sanction for discovery violations); Smith v. Our
Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 444-48 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing
the lower court's use of Rule 11, Rule 26(g), § 1927, and the inherent power of
the court to impose monetary sanctions and public reprimand on plaintiff and
his lawyers); Walton v. Throgmorton, 652 N.E.2d 803, 807 (III. App. Ct. 1995)
(stating that dismissal with prejudice for abuse of discovery is to be employed
only as last resort-in cases "where the actions of a party show a deliberate,
contumacious, or unwarranted disregard of the court's authority").
Awards of serious sanctions for discovery violations are sometimes re-
versed on due process grounds. See Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 226-29 (5th
Cir. 1998) (reversing imposition of fines on defendants because court did not
use procedures adequate for a criminal contempt proceeding), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 2047 (1999); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 372,
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instances of perceived obstruction of access to evidence or other
discovery violations to a disciplinary or ethics committee for
appropriate action,272 although that course of action should al-
ways be available even when an offending lawyer is thought to
be beyond the limits of a court's territorial/jurisdictional
reach.273 It is rarer still to find cases in which judges refer law-
yers who flagrantly fail to satisfy their discovery obligations to
prosecutors for investigation of obstruction of justice charges. 274
377-381 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that suspending defense counsel as discovery
sanction without affording particularized notice violated counsels' due process
rights); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 368-
69 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing order imposing sanctions of $115 million for re-
peated violation of discovery orders since sanctions were punitive hence crimi-
nal in nature, and had been imposed without constitutional protections ac-
corded criminal contempt defendants).
272. See, e.g., Richard Pliskin, "Rambo" Litigation Tactics Sanctioned,
N.J.L.J., July 25, 1994, at 8 (reporting that U.S. District Court Judge William
Bassler, in addition to imposing sanctions of $70,000 of attorney's fees against
attorney for harassing litigation tactics, also "referred [lawyer's] conduct to
state and federal ethics officials for disciplinary review and to the U.S. Attor-
neys' Offices in Newark and Manhattan for criminal investigation"). But see
McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 904-06 (5th Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that grievance committee of Texas bar decided that no disciplinary
violation had occurred, despite trial court's finding that defendant's in-house
counsel had engaged in discovery violations by destroying documents respon-
sive to plaintiffs requests for production of documents).
273. Obstructing a deposition or destroying documents that are responsive
to a Rule 34 request, even if committed beyond the limits of a court's territo-
rial reach by a lawyer who is not a member of the bar of the court in which the
proceedings are pending, should be considered a tortious act sufficient to bring
the conduct within the reach of the long-arm statutes of most, if not all states,
hence state and also federal courts, assuming service of appropriate process on
the offending lawyer.
274. Two well-known examples are the Berkey Photo-Kodak civil antitrust
litigation, see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), and the DuPont-Benlate litigation, see In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d at 369 n.7. In Kodak, a partner at a well-known
New York City law firm eventually pleaded guilty to one count of obstruction
of justice for suppressing reports of an expert witness that should have been
produced to the plaintiffs and then lying to the court about it. See Jack Egan,
Former Kodak Lawyer Charged With Contempt, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1978,
at D9. In one of the Benlate cases, the Eleventh Circuit, in reversing the dis-
trict court's imposition of a $115 million fine against DuPont for withholding
evidence during the trial, also suggested that a criminal investigation of
DuPont and its lawyers was called for if it had not already been undertaken.
See Milo Geyelin, Fine Against DuPont in Benlate Case Is Overturned by Fed-
eral Appeals Court, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1996, at B9. DuPont eventually paid
a fine of $11.25 million to end the criminal action. See Torri Still, DuPont
Suits Surface Again, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 16, 1999, at 4.
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These conditions create a climate in which so-called "Rambo"275
litigation flourishes.
Even apart from courts' unwillingness to award sanctions
beyond attorneys' fees except where there has been a violation
of an existing court order compelling discovery,276 judicial re-
sponses to serious discovery violations are often manifestly in-
adequate. 277 This is true despite generations of critics who
have emphasized that in order for discovery to succeed, courts
must not shrink from using the sanctions provided by the
rules.2 7 8 Indeed, variations on the theme of insufficient judicial
responses to discovery violations appear so frequently in the
literature of reported opinions that they have become judicial-
rhetorical topoi. One is solemnly to invoke the sanctioning
authority and then to give the transgressing lawyer or party
"one more chance."279 Another is to criticize an offending law-
yer or party severely on the record and then do little or nothing
about the offending behavior.280 Three select but not unusual
examples more than suffice to make the point.
First, in Llewellyn v. North American Trading,281 after
holding defendants' untimely objections to plaintiffs discovery
requests waived and noting that defendants had not complied
with discovery orders previously entered on two separate occa-
sions by the district judge and magistrate judge, for which
sanctions of plaintiffs' attorney's fees incurred in obtaining the
orders had been awarded, the magistrate judge solemnly re-
275. See infra notes 297-302.
276. See supra pp. 554-55.
277. As Justice Stephen G. Crane stated in his handbook for the New York
State Supreme Court, "[Jiudges complain that there are too many discovery
motions and too much indifference to discovery orders, yet many a judge will
let the culprit off to rob again." STEPHEN G. CRANE, HANDBOOK ON CASE
MANAGEMENT 49 (1996).
278. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(g), advisory committee's note to the 1983
amendment; see also Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 496-97.
279. See, e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Rockwell Slapped Over Access to Shuttle
Papers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 14, 1995, at A9 (describing how the district judge im-
posed $10,000 in penalties on Rockwell and shifted all attorney's fees of a for-
mer employee who litigated access to documents, as well as $3,000 in sanc-
tions against Rockwell's Houston law firm). The Judge said he would stop
short of entering judgment against Rockwell for discovery abuse including re-
peated disobedience of court orders and gave Rockwell and its officials "one
final opportunity to conduct themselves properly." Id.
280. See Murray v. Sevier, 993 F. Supp. 1394, 1405 (M.D. Ala. 1997);
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, No. Civ. A. 95-3997, 1996 WL 515500, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 1996) (mem.).
281. No. 93 Civ. 8894, 1996 WL 715532 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1996).
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cited the court of appeals' admonition that attorneys flout dis-
covery orders at their peril. 28 2 Nonetheless, he then denied
plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' answer, since to do so
would be equivalent to entering a default judgment and part of
the fault was attributable to the conduct of defendant's law-
yer.283 He once more awarded plaintiff the expenses of its dis-
covery motion and then stated:
Counsel for defendants should not, however, mistake the meaning
of my exercise of discretion. This is defendants' final warning. Un-
less defendants respond fully to all outstanding interrogatories and
document requests within ten (10) days of the date of this Order, I
shall issue a Report and Recommendation, recommending that a de-
fault judgment be entered. Put plainly, this is defendants' last chance
to comply with its discovery obligations.
Here, the judicial bite was nowhere up to its bark, and it ap-
pears that the lucky defendants already had two chances more
than they were entitled to under the Federal Rules.
Why, in such cases, should not the failures of counsel to
comply with discovery obligations be attributed to their clients,
even if it means foreclosing claims and defenses? The rules
plainly contemplate striking claims and defenses,28 5 and clients
ordinarily bear the consequences of their counsel-agents' ac-
tions and behavior in all other areas of the law. Even in the
criminal context, the prejudice to the client by way of loss of
liberty or even death is generally not sufficient to outweigh the
binding effects of counsel's actions, including mistakes.286
Courts often rationalize reluctance to preclude claims or de-
fenses by reference to the policy preference that cases be de-
cided on their merits. Where evasion or destruction of evidence
by the lawyer or client threatens to prevent discovery, however,
merits adjudication becomes impossible or at best unreliable.
Thus, rationalizing failure to preclude claims or defenses by
reference to the policy preference that claims be decided on
their merits makes no sense, especially where the dereliction is
the lawyer's, since a malpractice remedy is available. As long
282. See id. at *2.
283. See id.
284. Id. at *3.
285. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
286. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal or in
a habeas corpus proceeding, a convicted defendant must show that counsel's
derelictions were "of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the court and
make the proceedings a farce and a mockery ofjustice." United States v. Hor-
ton, 334 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1964) (quoting Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d
436, 439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
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as courts think that the policy of deciding claims on their mer-
its means allowing parties to flout discovery orders without se-
rious consequences, discovery disputes will never disappear.
Sanders v. Toyo Umpanki Co. 287 provides another example
of empty judicial rhetoric. There the court excoriated defense
counsel for "prejudicial and reprehensible" conduct in with-
holding critical evidence from plaintiff until the eve of trial and
characterized defense counsel's approach as part of a pattern of
abuse regularly engaged in by defense counsel's firm.28 8 The
court then stated that "[albusive discovery practice such as this
simply will not be tolerated by this Court" and concluded that
in light of the fact that defense counsel's withholding of evi-
dence was deliberate, the court should have excluded certain
evidence adduced by the defendant. 2 9 After all this, the court
still denied plaintiffs motion for new trial and failed to impose
any sanction on defense counsel.290
Why, if an identifiable team of lawyers regularly engages
in suppression of evidence, should a court not impose sanctions
with deterrent bite beyond a tongue-lashing in an unreported
opinion? If the integrity of the discovery process is important
in reaching litigation outcomes that are just, reliable, and wor-
thy of public confidence, why did this court not institute disci-
plinary proceedings against lawyers whom it perceived to cor-
rupt the process repeatedly? Why did the court not initiate
action to suspend the offending lawyers from practice or re-
move them from its bar, and why did the court not grant plain-
tiffs motion for new trial? In light of the court's complete fail-
ure to act, the unfortunate reality is that its seemingly
powerful rhetorical attack on defense counsel amounts to little
more than free advertising.
Third, Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford29' furnishes an ex-
ample of an insufficient judicial response to deliberate falsifica-
tion of discovery responses by counsel. Gonsalves was a six-
year-long civil rights case for wrongful death, as the result of a
beating followed by withholding of appropriate medical treat-
ment, of a man who had died in the custody of the City's police
department. After judgment for the plaintiff, decedent's sister
and administratrix, the case settled for a payment by the City
287. No. Civ. A. 7:92-2402-3, 1994 WL 902775 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 1994).
288. See id. at *1-3.
289. Id. at *5.
290. See id.
291. 168 F.R.D. 102 (D. Mass. 1996).
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of $555,000 to plaintiff, an exchange of mutual releases, and
vacatur of the judgments against the City and Mayor.292
In its post-settlement opinion, the court addressed some
unpleasant unfinished business, namely plaintiff's counsel's
deliberate violations of both his discovery obligations under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and his duty of candor to the
court, and possible sanctions against plaintiff. The court found
that counsel, by preparing false interrogatory responses about
plaintiffs decedent's health and suppressing evidence of his
hospitalization, had deliberately concealed from defendants the
material information that plaintiffs decedent was HIV positive
at the time of his death.293 This information about the state of
decedent's health was both clearly responsive to defendants' in-
terrogatories and obviously relevant to the issue of hedonic
damages. Counsel had caused plaintiff to sign false interroga-
tory responses that he had prepared (thus possibly subjecting
her to penalties of perjury), while purporting to limit the effect
of his own signature to objections to the interrogatories. The
court imposed sanctions on plaintiffs counsel in the amount of
$15,000 to be paid to the clerk of the court but expressly de-
clined to refer the matter to the Board of Bar Overseers of the
United States District Court.294
The reasons for the court's leniency with plaintiffs counsel
were that it approved of the benefits that counsel had achieved
both for plaintiff and for the community at large as a "private
attorney general," that the plaintiffs lawyer was a former As-
sistant Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, and that the court assumed counsel would be concerned
enough about his reputation not to sin again.295 Collectively,
they signify that in the court's view, a favorable result yielding
public benefit partly made amends for the means by which it
was reached, namely deliberate suppression of unfavorable evi-
dence and fraud on the court. Apart from the obvious "endsjustifies the means" fallacy,296 the problem, of course, is that if
292. See id. at 103-04. Pursuant to the settlement, counsel would receive
$231,700 in attorney's fees, rather than more than $800,000 petitioned for by
counsel following the trial. See id. at 104.
293. See id. at 106-14. The court also found that counsel had concealed
this information from the court by making arguments that he knew to be false.
See id. at 113.
294. See id. at 105-07, 116-17.
295. Id. at 117.
296. Although the media often indulge this fallacy in television shows such
as The Practice (ABC television broadcast), which often lauds a small firm for
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one "good guy" gets off easily for suppression of evidence and
fraud on the court in the District of Massachusetts, why should
not everyone?
In light of the persistent judicial preference for lenient
treatment of discovery violations, including flagrant ones, it is
difficult to argue with those who blame judges for helping to
create an environment in which discovery misbehavior, in-
cluding so-called "Rambo"297 litigation tactics, can flourish. 298
Commentators view the Rambo phenomenon variously, in-
cluding as a problem of lawyer incivility299 and as a problem of
lawyer insecurity caused by both fear of losing and greed.3°°
Although some believe that Rambo and hardball tactics have
increased in recent years,301 it is beyond dispute that such ob-
structive and evasive stratagems had equally dilatory, if per-
haps more genteel, prototypes in earlier times.30 2
taking just about any action at all that helps its clients, could not one have ex-
pected greater sophistication from a federal court?
297. Although the concept of the overly aggressive, contentious, antagonis-
tic and obstructive lawyer is well known, the name Rambo derives from the
character John Rambo, a U.S. Green Beret veteran in the novel First Blood,
DAVID MORELL, FIRST BLOOD (1972), and played by Sylvester Stallone in the
films FIRST BLOOD (Orion 1982), RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II (Orion 1985)
and RAMBO III (Tristar 1988). See Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pit-
ting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 n.4
(1990).
298. See Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and
Low-Down Tactics in the Courts, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 81, 94-96 (1991).
299. See Reavley, supra note 297, at 638.
300. See PERLMUTTER, supra note 11, at 51-64, 71-77.
301. See In re Daniels, 570 A.2d 416, 428 (N.J. 1990) (noting that "hardball,
'Rambo-style' litigation tactics [are] on the rise"); The Tenth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146
F.R.D. 205, 216-32 (1992) (discussing the "Rambo litigator"); Sidney A. Fitz-
water, Toward a Renaissance of Professionalism in Trial Advocacy, 20 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 787, 789 (1989) (noting a proliferation of "hardball," "Rambo-
like" litigation tactics).
302. In a candid and amusing reflection on his career at a seminar for
judges held in 1958, Bruce Bromley, longtime head of the litigation depart-
ment at the Cravath firm, who in 1949 had served at Governor Thomas E.
Dewey's appointment as a Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, wrote:
By big case I mean protracted case. Now I was born, I think, to be a
protractor.... I quickly realized in my early years at the bar that I
could take the simplest antitrust case... and protract it for the de-
fense almost to infinity. [Bromley went on to describe his first motion
picture block booking case.] We won that case and as you know my
firm's meter was running all the time-every month for fourteen
years.
Bruce Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, Proceedings of the Semi-
nar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 417, 417-18 (1958)
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Regardless of these views, policymakers need to under-
stand and focus on three central, critical and sometimes forgot-
ten facts about Rambo. First, Rambo litigation is the logical
conclusion of partisan zealous advocacy unrestrained by super-
vening obligations to society or the justice system. It is the at-
torney's willingness-indeed, perceived obligation-to seize
every advantage for a client by any tactic not explicitly out-
lawed, no matter how nasty or unpleasant the means, regard-
less whether the client is entitled to it or not.30 3 Thus, Rambo
litigation is essentially a problem of professional ethics and re-
sponsibility, not merely a problem of enforcing civility and pro-
fessional courtesy, as some courts and commentators naively
have treated it. 304
Bar associations, courts and legislatures must eventually
recognize that Rambo litigation tactics, including overreaching
and obstruction in discovery, fundamentally threaten the effi-
cacy of pretrial fact-finding, compromise the reliability of adju-
dications and erode public confidence in the legal system. Until
they take steps to proscribe Rambo behaviors, including the
suspension or removal from practice of those who indulge in
them, the integrity of civil adjudication remains in jeopardy.
Second, Rambo is a style or tactic deliberately and opportu-
nistically assumed or cultivated often by intelligent and success-
ful lawyers because it works. 30 5 Excessive personal aggressive-
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840 (2d Cir.
1995) (identifying Lord Henry Brougham as an "early apostle of what today
would be known as Rambo litigation tactics").
303. See Wayne D. Brazil, Ethical Perspectives on Discovery Reform, 3 REV.
LITIG. 51, 58-59 (1982) ("The assumption that a lawyer inevitably serves the
best interests of the system by vigorously pursuing client interests through all
methods not currently deemed unlawful strikes me as fatuous. It is not un-
lawful to disclos[e] nothing until.., compelled by carefully crafted discovery
probes to do so.").
304. See Jerome J. Shestack, ABA Leader Promotes Professionalism, N.J.
LAW., Dec. 8, 1997, at 6 ("We need to resist the Rambo-type tactics in which
civility is mocked and ruckus is routine."); see also Roger Abrams, Law Schools
Must Teach Professionalism-Now, N.J.L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at 27 ("[Llack of ci-
vility and courtesy among lawyers has corroded the practice of law."); Infec-
tious Lawyers, N.J.L.J., Apr. 7, 1997, at 30 ("The virus has not been assigned a
specific name, although in its various forms it has been called hardball,
scorched earth or Rambo litigation. It is characterized by incivility and unpro-
fessionalism.").
305. This is not always the case, however. See, e.g., In re Jordan Schiff, No.
HP 22/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1993), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERs,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHIcS 775-79 (5th ed.
1998).
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ness, 306 nastiness and overreaching are tools, not immutable
personality characteristics, of Rambo lawyers. 30 7 One need not
be a social psychologist to know that these behaviors deter ad-
versaries from wanting to deal, confer or even speak with those
who assume them. They allow Rambo lawyers to obtain unfair
advantages not only in the discovery process, but also in many
other situations that involve cooperative regulation or private
bargaining.
Perhaps the best-known example of a Rambo litigator is
Joseph D. Jamail, who won for his client, Pennzoil Corp., the
largest civil judgment in American history against Texaco,
Inc.30 8 and whose aggressively obstructive and vulgar behavior
in depositions was singled out for condemnation by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in the well-known extraordinary adden-
dum to its opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc. 30 9 Jamail is not one of the four hundred wealthi-
306. See generally Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility and the Law of Ag-
gression, Michigan Legal Theory Workshop, University of Michigan Law
School (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
307. Doubtless one should make the philosophical point that eventually
one becomes the way one acts. This is easy to agree with in the case of aggres-
sive lawyers occasionally encountered who exult in the self-description, "We
pride ourselves on being assholes. It's part of the firm culture." Lawyers Wage
Civil War, Cmi. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 28, 1991, at 20.
308. The amount of the judgment was $10.53 billion, which at the time
Texaco's action challenging the constitutionality of the supersedeas bond pro-
visions of the State of Texas reached the Supreme Court of the United States
was estimated to exceed $11 billion, including prejudgment interest. See
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987). The case ultimately settled
for $3 billion, of which Jamail's fee was estimated to be $345 million. See Tex-
aco-Pennzoil Battle Is Over, J. COM., Apr. 8, 1988, at lB; The 400, FORBES,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 256.
309. 637 A.2d 34, 51-56 (Del. 1994). TheAddendum quotes the following
widely-reproduced excerpt from the deposition of Hugh Liedtke, a Paramount
director, defended by Mr. Jamail:
A. [Mr. Liedtke] I vaguely recall [Mr. Oresman's letter] .... I
think I did read it, probably.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston [Delaware counsel for QVC] ) Okay. Do you
have any idea why Mr. Oresman was calling that material to your at-
tention?
MR. JAMAIL: Don't answer that.
How would he know what was going on in Mr. Oresman's mind?
Don't answer it.
Go on to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No, Joe-
MR. JAMAIL: He's not going to answer that. Certify it. I'm going
to shut it down if you don't go to your next question.
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MR. JOHNSTON: No. Joe, Joe-
MR. JAMAIL: Don't "Joe" me, asshole. You can ask some ques-
tions, but get off of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off
a meat wagon. Now, we've helped you every way we can.
MR. JOHNSTON: Let's just take it easy.
MR. JAMAIL: No, we're not going to take it easy. Get done with
this.
MR. JOHNSTON: We will go on to the next question.
MR. JAMAIL: Do it now.
MR. JOHNSTON: We will go on to the next question. We're not
trying to excite anyone.
MR. JAMAIL: Come on. Quit talking. Ask the question. Nobody
wants to socialize with you.
MR. JOHNSTON: I'm not trying to socialize. We'll go on to an-
other question. We're continuing the deposition.
MR. JAMAIL: Well, go on and shut up.
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. JAMAIL: Yeah, you-
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. JAMAIL: I may be and you may be. Now, you want to sit
here and talk to me, fine. This deposition is going to be over with.
You don't know what you're doing. Obviously someone wrote out a
long outline of stuff for you to ask. You have no concept of what
you're doing.
Now, I've tolerated you for three hours. If you've got another
question, get on with it. This is going to stop one hour from now, pe-
riod. Go.
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. THOMAS: Come on, Mr. Johnston, move it.
MR. JOHNSTON: I don't need this kind of abuse.
MR. THOMAS: Then just ask the next question.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) All right. To try to move forward, Mr. Lied-
tke,... I'll show you what's been marked as Liedtke 14 and it is a
covering letter dated October 29 from Steven Cohen of Wachtell, Lip-
ton, Rosen & Katz including QVC's Amendment Number 1 to its
Schedule 14D-1, and my question-
A. No.
Q. -to you, sir, is whether you've seen that?
A. No. Look, I don't know what your intent in asking all these
questions is, but, my God, I am not going to play boy lawyer.
Q. Mr. Liedtke-
A. Okay. Go ahead and ask your question.
Q. -I'm trying to move forward in this deposition that we are en-
titled to take. I'm trying to streamline it.
MR. JAMAIL: Come on with your next question. Don't even talk
with this witness.
MR. JOHNSTON: I'm trying to move forward with it.
MR. JAMAIL: You understand me? Don't talk to this witness ex-
cept by question. Did you hear me?
MR. JOHNSTON: I heard you fine.
MR. JAMAIL: You fee makers think you can come here and sit in
somebody's office, get your meter running, get your full day's fee by
asking stupid questions. Let's go with it.
2000]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
est individuals in the United States310 because he is stupid or
unsuccessful in his work.31' In non-vocational contexts, Mr.
Jamail is reported to be both personally charming and a gener-
ous philanthropist. 312
His technique in discovery, however, is apparently to ob-
struct and bully by any means possible. In the following 1992
deposition excerpt from a lawsuit in which he represented
plaintiffs against the Monsanto Company, he was disputing
whether his adversary, counsel for Monsanto, should be per-
mitted to object to questions and represent the deposition wit-
ness, a former Monsanto employee:
JAMAIL: You don't run this deposition, you understand?
CARSTARPHEN: Neither do you, Joe.
JAMAIL: You watch and see. You watch and see who does, Big
Boy... And don't be telling other lawyers to shut up. That isn't your
goddamned job, Fat Boy.
CARSTARPHEN: Well, that's not your job, Mr. Hairpiece.
THE WITNESS: As I said before, you have an incipient
JAMAIL: What do you want to do about it, asshole?
WITNESS: I'd like to knock you on your ass.
JAMAIL: Come over here and try it, you dumb son of a bitch.
Come over here.
CARSTARPHEN: You're not going to bully this guy.
JAMAIL: Oh, you big fat tub of shit, sit down.
CARSTARPHEN: I don't care how many of you come up against
me.
Id. at 53-54.
310. Jamail has been on Forbes's annual list of the four hundred wealthiest
Americans since 1989. In October 1997, his net worth was reported to be $950
million. See The 400, supra note 308, at 256.
311. Although I believe that cooperation is a good thing and that mutual
cooperation increases efficiency, I find law school courses in alternative dis-
pute resolution that emphasize "getting to yes" disturbing, since they too often
fail even to advert to the fact that lawyers in the real world sometimes use
over-aggressiveness and personal nastiness-in short, Rambo tactics-as a
strategy in all negotiation situations. Faced with Rambo, a lawyer interested
in "getting to yes" will have a difficult time not sacrificing his client's interests,
to say nothing of avoiding being eaten alive.
312. Joseph Jamail, for example, has been a generous benefactor of the
arts, charities, education and athletics in Texas, see Mary Ann Roser, UT Gets
$5 million in Joe Jamail's $17 Million Gift to Arts, Education, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al; and is often described in the press as well
able to turn on the charm when he wants to. See Roger Parloff, Fare's Fair,
AM. LAW., Oct. 1993, at 60; see also Diane Jennings, King of Torts: Corporate
Giant Killer? Planet-sized Ego? Joe Jamail Won't Argue the Case, CHI. TRIB.,
July 25, 1989, at C1.
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JAMAIL: Oh, you big fat tub of shit, sit down. Sit down, you fat
tub of shit.13
Upon reading this excerpt, as well as the one quoted by the
Delaware Supreme Court in its Addendum to Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the question is un-
avoidable why Mr. Jamail is still permitted to practice law at
all, anywhere. The Delaware Supreme Court, in inviting Ja-
mail to show why in the future he should not be barred from
participating in proceedings related to actions pending in the
Delaware courts, understood this to be the critical issue, and
knew that discovery obstruction of the magnitude and charac-
ter exemplified by the excerpt from Paramount fundamentally
undermines the integrity of, and respect for, the adjudicative
process and its results. Given Jamail's response-he was
quoted as stating "I'd rather ha[vel a nose on my ass then go to
Delaware for any reason"314-and his failure to appear as in-
vited before the Delaware Supreme Court, one wonders why
the court failed to take further action by referring the matter
publicly to the Texas Supreme Court. Although the matter ap-
pears to have come to the attention of the State Bar of Texas,
no public discipline followed, and it is likely that the matter
was reviewed and dismissed by a local grievance panel in Hous-
ton.315 The Delaware Supreme Court's condemnation of Ja-
mail's behavior appears to have been regrettably without ef-
fect,316 a fact which exemplifies the final critical point about
Rambo lawyers.
Third, the Rambo strategy of seizing every advantage not
expressly outlawed, including evading, obstructing, and 'jerking
the adversary around" until forced to comply with specific direc-
tives from the court, is rational only because of the low likeli-
313. Let's Work Together for a Lawyers' Civility Rights Act, IND. LAW., Aug.
23, 1995, at 7. A lengthier excerpt, including this passage, but with counsel's
names changed, is included in PERLMUTTER, supra note 11, at 39-44.
314. Brenda Sapiro, Jamail Unfazed by Delaware Court's Blast, TEx. LAW.,
Feb. 14, 1994, at 11.
315. See Jerry Urban, State Bar to Review Lawyer Rebuked by Delaware
Court, HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 15, 1994, at A15; see also E-mail from James M.
McCormack, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, to
author (Feb. 22, 1999) (on file with author) (stating that because no public dis-
cipline occurred, Mr. Jamail's case was most likely dismissed).
316. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the court's QVC addendum, espe-
cially its statement that in cases of misconduct at depositions "Delaware trial
courts are 'but a phone call away,'" has had a beneficial prophylactic effect on
the conduct of depositions in Delaware. Paramount Communications Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 55 (Del. 1994).
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hood that appropriate sanctions will ever be imposed. The
Rambo lawyer's incentive structure thus resembles one gently
satirized in a well-known story traditionally told of Nasrudin,
the holy fool of Sufi legend:
Nasrudin was caught in the act and sentenced to die. Hauled up be-
fore the king, he was asked by the Royal Presence: "Is there any rea-
son at all why I shouldn't have your head off right now?" To which he
replied: "Oh, King, live forever! Know that I, the mullah Nasrudin,
am the greatest teacher in your kingdom, and it would surely be a
waste to kill such a great teacher. So skilled am I that I could even
teach your favorite horse to sing, given a year to work on it." The
king was amused, and said: "Very well, then, you move into the stable
immediately, and if the horse isn't singing a year from now, we'll
think of something interesting to do with you."
As he was returning to his cell to pick up his spare rags, his cell-
mate remonstrated with him: "Now that was really stupid. You know
you can't teach the horse to sing, no matter how long you try." Nas-
rudin's response: "Not at all. I have a year now that I didn't have be-
fore. And a lot of things can happen in a year. The king might die.
The horse might die. I might die.
And, who knows? Maybe the horse will sing."317
In discovery, a Rambo lawyer's favorite strategy is "to give
as little as possible so [your opponents] will have to come back
and back and back and maybe will go away or give up," as one
unusually candid lawyer responded to Magistrate Judge Bra-
zil's 1980 American Bar Foundation study of attitudes of law-
yers in Chicago. 318 Indeed, there is a much greater chance that
the adversary will eventually give up and go away than that
most courts will ever issue effective sanctions against Rambo
lawyers. As Judge Keeton has written, "[tihe message appears
to be that the remedy for hardball is more hardball-hardball
judges to control and punish hardball lawyers. I believe judges
in general have neither the time, the resources, nor the will to
undertake this responsibility."319 Rambo lawyers know this.
The chances that they will ever be subject to severe or serious
sanctions for routinely playing hardball in discovery, given the
current judicial climate, are about the same as that Nasrudin's
horse will sing. Absent effective judicial control and deterrent
317. This retelling is from the homepage of Professor John Lawler of the
University of Michigan (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http//www-personal.umich.
edul-jlawler/aue/sig.html>. Many of the Nasrudin stories have been collected
and published by Idries Shah. See, e.g., IDRIES SHAH, THE ExPLoITs OF THE
INcOMPARABLE MULLA NASRUDIN (Octagon Press 1966).
318. Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 9, at 829.
319. Robert E. Keeton, Times Are Changing for Trials in Court, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993) (emphasis added).
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use of sanctions, and with their techniques of obstruction
serving Rambo lawyers so well, why should they change?
CONCLUSION
From its introduction to federal procedure in 1938, discov-
ery was intended to alter the nature of adversarial litigation to
promote cooperative pretrial fact-finding. As the findings of the
Federal Judicial Center Report and the RAND Report confirm,
the change has successfully taken hold in two areas: routine or
low-stakes lawsuits and litigation in arenas with relatively
small bars in which lawyers encounter each other, and judges,
repeatedly.
Especially in complex and high-stakes cases, however, and
in otherwise particularly contentious litigation, conceptual
flaws and structural defects prevent civil discovery from work-
ing as intended. The following problems all have contributed to
what has become an enduring and intractable problem of our
legal culture: conflicts between discovery's cooperative ideal
and the rest of adversarial litigation's aggressively partisan
ethic,3 20 and between the obligation not to obstruct one's adver-
sary from obtaining evidence and the imperative of obtaining
and preserving informational advantage; the strains placed on
discovery by the demands of notice pleading and the uncertain-
ties of proof; the Federal Rules' inadequate disincentives to
evasion and to resort to judicial intervention to resolve discov-
ery disputes; judges' oft-demonstrated reluctance or inability to
manage complex discovery efficaciously and to resolve discov-
ery disputes expeditiously; and the bar's refusal to take respon-
sibility for the integrity of the discovery process by bringing
professional discipline to bear to enforce discovery duties, in-
cluding the ethical obligation not to obstruct other parties from
obtaining evidence.
Not only do these failings impede discovery in practice, in-
creasing litigation delay and expense; they also imperil the in-
tegrity of adjudication of complex and high-stakes lawsuits and
undermine public confidence in the civil justice system. In par-
ticular, evasion and disregard of discovery obligations and ob-
320. Problems of stonewalling and Rambo litigation derive in large part
from the development of that ethic, but they also respond to perceived client
needs and desires: some clients demand overly aggressive litigation tactics,
while many would like to bury or obscure "bad" or embarrassing facts and in-
criminating evidence. Many lawyers strive to provide what their clients de-
sire.
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struction of adversaries' access to relevant information and evi-
dence fundamentally undermine our system's policy of deciding
controversies on their merits.
Justice Powell's famous dissent from the adoption of the
1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could
apply equally well to the "tinkering" changes presently under
consideration by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.321 Al-
terations such as imposing a presumptive limit on the length of
a deposition day, adjusting the scope of automatic disclosure
and eliminating the opt-out provision, or trying to rearrange
the balance between attorney-managed discovery and court-
managed discovery will not solve the problems of persistent
overdiscovery, evasion, delay, and confrontation rather than
cooperation in complex and high-stakes cases.
There should be no doubt about the causes of these prob-
lems, as described above. Unfortunately, however, neither the
judiciary nor the legal profession has shown any indication of
having the will to address them head on. Given their reluc-
tance, one might rationally conclude that it is time for the Ad-
visory Committee to consider more global solutions, 322 such as
moving to an inquisitorial model, like that which informs the
litigation paradigm of the continental European legal systems.
Adopting an inquisitorial model would remove from the parties
and their counsel the primary responsibility for developing fac-
tual issues and gathering evidence and place this responsibility
on the judge, with the cooperation of counsel for the parties.323
However appealing such a change might be in theory, it
would be far too sweeping to receive serious practical consid-
eration. Its conflicts with central defining values of our present
litigation regime, including the adversarial development of is-
sues and evidence and the traditional notion of the umpireal
judge more than suffice to make it unacceptable. Moreover, if
judges already are uncomfortable with the prospect of excessive
involvement in discovery, it is difficult to imagine that they
would be willing to accept primary responsibility for develop-
ment of issues and investigation of necessary evidence.
321. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
322. For the distinction between "tinkering" and "global" changes, see
Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REv. 809,
814-26 (1998).
323. For a description of the fact discovering and evidence gathering func-
tions of these systems, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of'
the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017 (1998).
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Problems of discovery thus ultimately evidence two par-
ticular problems of professional responsibility. History shows
that neither the bar nor the bench has been willing to accept
responsibility for the integrity of the civil discovery process, ei-
ther in enforcing the rules as they exist or in developing and
implementing a new body of professional responsibility direc-
tives for pretrial representation.324
Suggesting that we must therefore learn to live with per-
sistent discovery problems in complex, high-stakes, and other-
wise contentious cases is far from the happiest of conclusions.
It is illusory to think that discovery problems can be elimi-
nated, however, given lawyerly and judicial reluctance to ad-
dress discovery's central flaws and to assure the integrity of the
process in complex and high-stakes cases. If the total solution
of discovery problems is not possible, however, must we con-
clude that nothing can be done? The answer is "hardly." If the
courts, bar associations and Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
cannot make discovery's flaws disappear, perhaps their atten-
tion and effort would better be directed to the more restricted
goal of devising a plan for containing discovery problems, by
announcing a clear ethic for lawyers participating in discovery
and then trying to implement and enforce it.
324. Professor Cooper informs me that "[slome of the proponents of the
1993 version of initial disclosure hoped that the combination of the Rule 26(f)
conference with the obligation to disclose damaging information would begin
the process of changing the ethic of representation[,]" and that many litigators
report that the Rule 26(f) conference, when used, has proved the most effective
of recent discovery reforms. Comments by Edward H. Cooper to the author on
a draft of this Article presented to the University of Michigan Law School Le-
gal Theory Workshop on Mar. 15, 1999 (on file with author).
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